The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations[*]

Noam Lupu
University of Wisconsin-Madison
lupu@wisc.edu

Leonid Peisakhin
New York University – Abu Dhabi
leonid.peisakhin@nyu.edu

Abstract: Does political violence leave a lasting historical legacy on political attitudes and behaviors? We argue that political violence influences the identities and perceptions of victims and that families transmit these effects from one generation to the next. In turn, these identities and perceptions shape the contemporary political attitudes and behaviors of the descendants of victims of political violence. Testing these hypotheses is fraught with potential methodological challenges stemming from the endogeneity of violence and the difficulty of distinguishing family socialization from personal experience. To overcome these challenges, we leverage a natural experiment: the deportation of Crimean Tatars to Central Asia in 1944 and the indiscriminate way in which deportees died from starvation and disease. We conducted a multigenerational survey of Crimean Tatars in 2014 and find the descendants of individuals who suffered more intensely identify more strongly with their ethnic group, think of themselves as victims, and perceive the Russian state as more of a threat. We show that these identities and perceptions are passed down from the victims of 1944 to their children and grandchildren. We also find that these political identities and perceptions make the grandchildren of those more intensely victimized more politically engaged, more supportive of the Crimean Tatar political community, and more hostile toward Russia. Violence has lasting legacies that shape political attitudes and behaviors across generations.

Keywords: political violence; historical legacies; family socialization; Crimean Tatars

States regularly perpetrate political violence against their inhabitants, whether through beatings, kidnappings, forced resettlements, arrests, or murder, to devastating effect.[1] A highly conservative, state-sanctioned estimate puts the number of the victims of Stalinist repressions at 3.8 million (Zemskov 1991), and an estimated 1.5 million people died in the countryside alone during China's Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2008). Moreover, state-sponsored and politically motivated violence against minority groups remains a defining feature of contemporary politics globally. These experiences of political violence profoundly shape how victims interact with the state and think about politics in the future. Some become politically apathetic and withdraw from political activity (Benard 1994; Wood 2006), whereas others mobilize into collective action (e.g., Blattman 2009). Many develop feelings of victimization and heightened sensitivity to perceived threats as a result of these traumatic experiences (e.g., Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009).

How long do these effects last? Political scientists have recently noted that political experiences can sometimes have long-lasting legacies. Institutions can have lasting effects on politics long after they cease to exist (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Dell 2010; Jha 2013; Peisakhin 2012), and political identities formed in a particular historical moment can endure for decades across generations (e.g., Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Lupu and Stokes 2010; Wittenberg 2006). But these legacies are thought to be transmitted through persistent institutions, economic structures, or religious networks. Might experiences of political violence similarly leave lasting legacies, passed down *through families* from generation to generation?

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[1] We use the term political violence to refer to physical violence perpetrated against individuals by political actors, including the state.

Answering this question is empirically challenging. Victims of political violence are typically targeted because of their group membership, political attitudes, or behaviors (e.g., Kalyvas 2006). Argentina's disappeared, for instance, were mostly selected because of their political preferences, associations, and activism. This makes it difficult for researchers to know whether the distinctive attitudes and behaviors of victims of political violence are actually caused by the violence. Moreover, victims' descendants may themselves be targets of further political violence. In the Jim Crow era, African Americans descended from the victims of slavery were themselves targets of political discrimination, harassment, and abuse. As a result, it may be difficult to discern whether the descendants of victims hold particular attitudes because of their ancestors' experiences or because of their own victimization.

This paper overcomes these challenges by studying the Crimean Tatars, a minority Muslim population living in Crimea. We study the legacy of political violence that took place during the Crimean Tatars' deportation from their homeland to Central Asia in 1944 as part of the Stalinist repressions (Pohl 1997; Williams 2002). Between a quarter and a half of all Crimean Tatar deportees perished during or within a year of resettlement because of poor conditions on the trains, rampant infectious diseases, squalor, and starvation (Bekirova 2004). The Tatars faced other major restrictions until 1956, but it was that initial deportation and loss of so many lives that constituted for this community the most acute experience of victimization at the hands of the Soviet Union. The children of the victimized generation came of age in the 1970s; by that time, most restrictions on Crimean Tatars had been lifted. The grandchildren of the deportees were mostly born after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many once their families had returned to Crimea, then part of Ukraine.

We argue that political violence of the kind suffered by Crimean Tatars deeply affects the social identities and perceptions of its victims. In particular, we posit that political violence intensifies victims' attachment to their social group, intensifies feelings of victimhood, and heightens the perception of future threat. We further argue that these psychological responses are transmitted from parent to child, and that they inform their contemporary political attitudes and behaviors. In the context of our study, we expect the descendants of Crimean Tatars more intensely victimized during the 1944 deportation to be more politically engaged, more supportive of the Crimean Tatar community, and more hostile toward the Russian state.

To test these hypotheses, we conducted a representative multigenerational survey of Crimean Tatar families living in Crimea in 2014. Consistent with our expectations, we find that third-generation respondents with ancestors who suffered more intensely during and shortly after the deportation identify more strongly with their ethnic group, think of themselves as victims, and fear the recurrence of victimization more acutely. In turn, these identities and perceptions strengthen their support for the Crimean Tatar political community, intensify their hostility toward Russia, and increase their political participation. To probe the mechanisms of transmission, we also show that violent victimization affects the identities and perceptions of our first-generation respondents, and that they transmit these characteristics through the family, to their children and grandchildren. Like other political experiences, violence can have lasting impacts on political identities, attitudes, and behaviors. And like other social networks, families can transmit the effects of violence across generations. In Crimea, political violence that took place over 70 years ago has left a lasting legacy that shapes how Crimean Tatars today think about and participate in politics.

Violence, Historical Legacies, and Family Socialization

Violence has powerful consequences for politics. Wartime violence may break down social institutions and lock countries into conflict traps (Walter 2004). Whereas some scholars argue that violence fragments communities and destroys social cohesion (Gibson and Gouws 2003; Walter and Snyder 1999), others find that violence can force communities to overcome differences and strengthens cohesion (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Voors et al. 2012).[2]

Yet, we still know little about how violence affects individual political behavior and attitudes. Several recent studies find that victims of political violence tend to become more resilient and more politically engaged (Blattman 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014; Javeline and Baird 2011; Krznaric 1997; Shewfelt 2009; Wood 2003, 2008),[3] although the empirical record remains mixed (see Balcells 2012; Benard 1994; Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik Forthcoming; Wood 2006).[4] Following these studies, we expect victims of violence to participate more in politics.[5]

Psychologists have studied extensively the emotional and attitudinal effects of political violence. As a subtype within broader research on trauma, political violence appears to generate psychological distress that leads to disorders linked to depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic

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[2] Even the social cohesion fostered by violence can breed other kinds of violence in peacetime (Bateson 2013).

[3] There is also evidence that the organization of political participation induced by violence differs from other forms of participation (Iktonen 2007; Jennings 1998).

[4] Bateson (2012) finds a similar mobilizing effect among victims of crime.

[5] However, we expect the mechanism to be different than the one proposed by previous research in political science, particularly Blattman (2009). He interprets his findings that violence increases political participation as evidence for an emerging set of studies in psychology that argue that traumatic experiences can have positive psychological effects (see Laufer and Solomon 2006). Instead, we hypothesize that it is the effects of violence on social identity and threat perceptions that affect behaviors like political participation, as victims engage in politics to guard against future violence. Our survey did not include the battery of psychological questions that might allow us to distinguish between these mechanisms, but we hope to do so in future work.

stress (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006; Johnson and Thompson 2008; Katz et al. 2002). Such experiences often heighten victims' perception of threat from the social group associated with the perpetrator, yielding stronger in-group attachments, hostile and exclusionist attitudes toward out-groups, and self-identities as victims (Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2013; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006; Huddy et al. 2005; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004). For instance, Israelis who survive Palestinian violence hold more exclusionist attitudes and support hardline parties (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009) and North Sudanese who experience rioting by southerners oppose giving southerners citizenship in the north (Beber, Roessler, and Scacco 2014). Nevertheless, much of this research focuses exclusively on the survivors of political violence themselves, typically shortly after their victimization and sometimes while violent conflicts are still ongoing.

We build on these findings to argue that political violence shapes the identities and perceptions of its victims. In particular, we expect victims of violence to identify more strongly with their social group, to view themselves as victims, and to hold heightened perceptions of the potential for future threats from the perpetrator. Psychologists have also found that the psychological effects of violence increase the more violence individuals suffer (Johnson and Thompson 2008). On the basis of these findings – and consistent with work in political science (Blattman 2009) – we expect that individuals exposed to more intense political violence will change more acutely. In other words, we expect something like a monotonic relationship between exposure to violence and changes in political identities and threat perception.

We further posit that the individual-level effects of political violence also persist over time. Political scientists have recently recognized that all sorts of political institutions, events,

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and experiences can have political implications that last for decades or even centuries. Researchers have shown how colonial practices (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Dell 2010; Díaz-Cayeros 2011; Easterly and Levine 2003; Jha 2013) or modes of tax collection (Banerjee and Iyer 2005) perpetuate inequality and underdevelopment. Others find that party systems formed in early political junctures can survive authoritarian interludes, or democratic "interruptions" (Lupu and Stokes 2010; Valenzuela and Scully 1996).

At the individual level, certain political attitudes also seem to survive even after the institutions that gave rise to them come under concerted attack or disappear altogether (Lankina and Getachew 2011; Peisakhin 2012; Wittenberg 2006; Woodberry 2012). Scholars have shown that people's initial experiences with specific systems of schooling leave a lasting legacy (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) and that certain experiences – like slavery (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2015; Nunn and Wantchekon 2011), life in a command economy (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014), or combat (Jha and Wilkinson 2012) – can leave lasting legacies of mistrust and sticky political preferences. Still, these historical legacies are thought to persist over time through communal and religious networks. Scholarship on historical legacies has largely overlooked the role of the family in handing down the effects of past political experiences from generation to generation (cf. Peisakhin 2015).

We add to the theorized mechanisms of historical legacies by arguing that the individual-level effects of political violence are transmitted within families from parents to children. Political scientists have long been aware that families socialize certain political identities. Studies have shown that parents transmit their partisan attachments to their children in the United States (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009) and some other advanced democracies (Westholm and Niemi 1992; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). Research

suggests that along with partisan identities, parents can also transmit ideological positioning on the left-right scale, politicized regional identities, and religiosity (Jennings and Niemi 1968, Rico and Jennings 2012, Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham 1986). Thus, there are good reasons to think that political violence may indeed have lasting legacies on individual attitudes and behaviors that are transmitted within families. But the research on family socialization has so far focused exclusively on religious and political identities in advanced, stable democracies.

Psychology studies of war veterans and Holocaust survivors have also found that they transmit the psychological disorders associated with their personal trauma to their offspring (e.g., Lev-Wiesel 2007; Weingarten 2004; Weiss and Weiss 2000; Yehuda, Halligan, and Bierer 2001). However, we are aware of only two studies that examine the intergenerational effects of political violence on political attitudes and behavior (Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla-Boado 2011; Balcells 2012).[6] On the whole, we still know very little about the long-term political legacies of violence on individual attitudes and behavior.

This paper thus brings additional theory and empirical evidence to bear on these questions. Building upon the scholarly work in both political science and psychology, we argue that political violence powerfully impacts victims' social identities and threat perceptions. In particular, we posit that violent victimization intensifies in-group social attachments, leads individuals to think of themselves as victims, and heightens the perception of threat from the perpetrating social group. Moving beyond the victims themselves, we also expect that victims will transmit these features of their social identities and threat perceptions to their descendants, making the family the locus of transmission of this historical legacy. And we anticipate that

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[6] They find a correlation between ancestor victimization and both political identities and attitudes regarding transitional justice, but no relationship with political participation. Both studies rely on descendant's reports of their ancestor's victimization and focus on a case – the Spanish Civil War – in which communities were systematically targeted because of their prior political allegiances.

these transmitted identities and perceptions in turn shape the contemporary political attitudes and behaviors of the descendants of victims of violence. Political violence thus not only influences the psychology of its victims, but also that of their descendants. The effects of violence inflicted long ago can have lasting repercussions for political attitudes and behaviors today.

A Natural Experiment with Crimean Tatars

There are two major challenges in identifying the causal effects of political violence across generations. First is the potential for endogeneity. The assignment of violence, particularly politically-motivated violence, is often associated with precisely the kinds of identities and behaviors we hypothesize that it affects. For instance, state authorities may target the members of a group that are most politically active, or those that identify most strongly with the group. Those identities are likely to be transmitted to their offspring (Jennings and Niemi 1981), so we would observe stronger social attachments among the descendants of victims. But we would wrongly infer that violence strengthens group attachments when, in fact, it may have no causal effect.

A second challenge in researching intergenerational transmission is that the descendants of victims may themselves also be targeted. For instance, states that target violence against groups within their borders may continue to do so over time. The descendants of prior victims may be more likely to become victims or may be discriminated against in other ways. In such a case, we would infer family transmission of political attitudes where instead individuals were affected by their own personal experiences. We address both of these challenges by studying the effects of violence across generations among Crimean Tatars. This entire community was

subject to state repression, but, crucially, the intensity of violence varied across individuals in arbitrary and, therefore, plausibly exogenous ways.

Over the course of May 18-20, 1944, days after the Soviet Union recaptured the Crimean Peninsula from Nazi Germany, the Red Army deported all Crimean Tatars (a population of roughly 190,000) to Central Asia on charges of collaborating with the Nazis (Bugai 2004; Williams 2002). Deportation came as a complete surprise to Crimean Tatars, who had no prior warning from the authorities. Families were given mere minutes to collect what few belongings they could carry by hand – most, affected by shock, only brought their papers (Aleshka et al. 2010).[7] As one Soviet officer recalled, "people became flustered, grabbed unnecessary things and we pushed them with our rifles toward the exit" (quoted in Uehling 2004: 89). The Soviet repressive apparatus had been so well honed in the purges and population movements of the 1930s that the whole operation took under 60 hours in a region very recently recovered from the enemy where telephone communications had been interrupted and many roads impassable. The train journey from Crimea to Central Asia (primarily Uzbekistan) lasted weeks. Food and water were scarce. According to official estimates, several thousand deportees perished in transit.

An estimated 16,000 more deportees died in the first six months in Central Asia, primarily from starvation or infectious diseases. Government statistics report that 15-25% of Crimean Tatar deportees perished immediately upon resettlement in 1944-45. In contrast, data collected by Crimean Tatar activists in the 1960s suggest that 46% of the Crimean Tatar population died during or right after deportation (Bekirova 2004). In our survey, 72% of

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[7] Uehling (2004) reports that a few Crimean Tatars with connections in the Red Army recalled hearing rumors of the deportation. There was certainly a precedent – other ethnic minorities had been deported from other regions recovered by the USSR in the final years of the war (Pohl 1997). But only very few soldiers could have known of the secret plan to deport the Crimean Tatars. There are no records – official or otherwise – of any Crimean Tatars who escaped deportation. In our fieldwork, we did not encounter a single Crimean Tatar with family members who had not been deported.

families reported losing at least one close relative over the course of those two initial years. During that time, Crimean Tatars lived in communal barracks within internment camps, an experience many have described as a "living hell." Although official orders required they be provided with regular food rations, survivors report receiving help only from locals, who also taught the deportees to farm in their new environment (Uehling 2004). Until 1956, Crimean Tatars were not permitted to leave the so-called "special settlement" camps without permission from Soviet authorities. Unlike almost all other deported groups, Crimean Tatars were not allowed to return to Crimea until 1989 (Bugai 2004).[8]

The Stalinist repressive system did not single out individuals within the Crimean Tatar community for deportation or especially harsh treatment; rather, the whole ethnic group was deported wholesale and placed in identically harsh conditions. There were no exceptions. Even Red Army veterans were treated the same way as known Nazi collaborators.[9] As a result, we can be confident that the degree of violence suffered by different Crimean Tatars is very plausibly exogenous to their existing political attitudes and behaviors.

Crimean Tatar families also experienced a massive disruption when it comes to their material wealth because they had so little time to gather their belongings. Deportation became the great equalizer. On arrival in Central Asia, all Crimean Tatars were equally destitute, living in refugee camps. This disruption meant that no material wealth could be transferred across generations, only political identities and perceptions.

At the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Crimea became an autonomous republic within independent Ukraine. Reputable estimates suggest that roughly 90% of Crimean Tatars

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[8] Except during a brief policy thaw in 1974 that went largely unnoticed.

[9] In our survey, 86% of first-generation respondents say that they had a family member who had served either in the Red Army or in Soviet partisan battalions.

returned to Crimea by the early 2000s (Zaloznaya and Gerber 2012).[10] The roughly 277,000

Crimean Tatars living in Crimea in 2012 made up about 12% of the population.

In March 2014, Russia seized upon political instability in Ukraine and annexed Crimea as

an administrative unit within the Russian Federation. Mass protests in Kiev and President Viktor

Yanukovych's flight from Ukraine created a political vacuum and opportunity for Russia to once

again rule Crimea,[11] despite international condemnation. As we demonstrate below, Russia's

annexation generated significant anxiety among Crimean Tatars.

Focusing on Crimean Tatars thus offers three empirical and methodological advantages

for studying the legacies of political violence. First, this population is compactly settled on the

Crimean Peninsula, making it logistically feasible to interview entire families. In addition, all

Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia in 1944, but some suffered more intense violence

than others. Some Tatars lost family members either during the deportation or shortly thereafter

to starvation or disease. Historical accounts suggest that this variation within the population of

deportees was arbitrary (Bugai 2004; Bekirova 2004; Uehling 2004); that is, that those

individuals who died during and shortly after deportation were not systematically different from

those who did not. We know, for instance, that infectious diseases spread in non-systematic

ways that mean that some people are affected even as identical individuals are spared (Mollison

1995). In methodological terms, assignment of the violence of a family member's death was

plausibly exogenous to people's existing attitudes and behaviors. This means we have as-if

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[10] To verify this, a pilot survey we conducted in July 2014 asked respondents whether any of their relatives had
stayed behind in Central Asia. Only 4 percent of our respondents answered in the affirmative. Anecdotal evidence
also suggests that few Crimean Tatars moved elsewhere after returning to Crimea from exile; students relocate
regularly to Ukraine, Turkey, and now increasingly Russia for college, and there has been a small, albeit steady,
trickle of emigrants to Turkey. Still, outmigration has been very low and we, therefore, have little concern about it
biasing our sample.

[11] The Peninsula had been part of the Russian Soviet Federal Republic in 1921-54.

random assignment of this type of violence (Dunning 2012), even though all Crimean Tatars suffered the violence of deportation. This exogeneity allows us to make causal inferences about the effects of violence.

A final methodological advantage of studying this particular population is that the grandchildren of living Crimean Tatars who personally experienced deportation have themselves had little or no interaction with the Soviet state.[12] This means that the fact that their grandparents had been victimized is unlikely to have affected their own personal interactions with politics. They were not themselves targeted by the state for further victimization because their ancestors had been victimized. As a result, any relationships we uncover between the victimization of their ancestors and their own identities, attitudes, or behaviors is likely the result of family socialization.

The Survey

We conducted a face-to-face, multigenerational survey of Crimean Tatars living in Crimea between November 2014 and January 2015. We began with a stratified sample of Crimean settlements in which at least 10% of the population was Crimean Tatar.[13] Interviewers randomly sampled households until they found a Crimean Tatar respondent over 73 years old,

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[12] Half of our sample of third-generation respondents was born after the collapse of the Soviet Union and another 45 percent was less than 10 when it collapsed. Limiting our analysis to only those born after the collapse does not substantively change our results (see online appendix).

[13] We calculated how Crimean Tatars are distributed across Crimea's 14 provinces (*raions*) and 11 cities using settlement-level population statistics from 2012 provided to us by the Crimean Tatar popular assembly, the Mejlis. Each province and city was then assigned the number of first-generation respondents proportionate to the size of the Crimean Tatar population residing within that administrative unit. Villages were selected randomly from within each province/city after settlements of fewer than 200 inhabitants and those with fewer than 10% Crimean Tatars (based on statistics from the 2001 Ukrainian census) were eliminated from the sample. We eliminated these settlements because of the difficulties accessing small, remote villages and locating older respondents in villages where Crimean Tatars are a small minority.

meaning they were at least three years old at the time of the deportation. After interviewing each

first-generation respondent, we followed the family chain down to the second and third

generations. Within each family, two second-generation respondents were randomly selected,

and subsequently two children of every second-generation respondent. We located second- and

third-generation respondents at their places of residence and made multiple revisits when

necessary. Our final sample consists of 300 first-generation respondents, 600 second-generation

respondents, and 1,004 third-generation respondents living in 23 towns and 191 villages across

Crimea.[14] The survey is thus representative of all Crimean Tatar families currently residing in

Crimea with at least one living survivor of the deportation.[15]

Our survey took place six months after the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Although

the conflict with Russian forces in Crimea was short-lived, we were concerned about Crimean

Tatars being reluctant to participate or to answer political questions. To address this issue, we

hired and trained ethnic Crimean Tatar enumerators, and we offered respondents a choice of

Russian or Crimean Tatar survey instruments.[16] During pilot surveys conducted in July and

October 2014, we found that respondents seemed comfortable sharing their political opinions

with Crimean Tatar interviewers, even when we were present.

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[14] Not every second-generation respondent had two children – the size of Crimean Tatar families has been decreasing over the course of the twentieth century – and some third-generation interviewees declined to participate in the study. The response rate was over 90% among first- and second-generation respondents, and around 70% among third-generation interviewees. For both these reasons, it was not always possible to interview four grandchildren in every family.

[15] Table A1 in the appendix provides further details on sample characteristics by generation.

[16] Only 28% of our respondents chose to do the survey in Crimean Tatar. Unsurprisingly, that proportion was higher among first-generation respondents (50%) and lower among third-generation respondents (16%). Crimean Tatars are overall fairly secular and few display outward appearances of piety. The Muslim headscarf, for instance, is worn by few women; none of our interviewers wore one. We are therefore not concerned about interviewer effects when it comes to our measures of religiosity (Blaydes and Fillum 2013).

Measuring the Legacies of Violence

Our primary independent variable of interest is violent victimization during and shortly after the 1944 deportation. We asked our first-generation respondents, "Did any of your family members[17] die during the train journey to the deportation location or immediately after in 1944-1945 because of poor conditions?" We recorded whether respondents said no members of their family had died, one person had died, 2 or 3 relatives had died, or more than 4 family members had died. This provides us with an ordinal measure that captures the intensity of violent victimization the respondent suffered above and beyond the violence of deportation.[18]

Using this measure assumes that additional violence has additional effects on its victims. After all, every one of our first-generation respondents suffered the violence of deportation because the whole Crimean Tatar community had been deported. Since we are comparing deportees to one another, what we are leveraging in our analysis is the *additional* violence some suffered and others did not. As discussed earlier, the additional violence suffered by some Crimean Tatar deportees was assigned in plausibly exogenous ways. Our ordinal measure also assumes that victimization is not a binary concept, but varies in intensity. This is consistent with findings in psychology that greater exposure to trauma leads to greater likelihood of developing psychological disorders (see Johnson and Thompson 2008).

Importantly, our measure also relies on the ability of our respondents to reliably recall and truthfully convey the deportation events. Given the absence of documentation about individual deaths, we lack objective measures of the intensity of violence suffered by Crimean

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[17] In Russian and Crimean Tatar, this formulation implies close family members: parents and grandparents, their siblings, and the respondent's own siblings.

[18] We also constructed a dichotomous measure that simply distinguishes those who reported no deaths from those who reported at least one close relative's death (see online appendix). Using this alternative measure does not substantively change our results.

Tatars during and shortly after deportation. This problem, of course, affects most individual-level studies of political violence, particularly when that violence is perpetrated by the very state in charge of vital records. As such, our approach follows the standard practice among scholars of this topic by relying on victims' self-reports (e.g., Balcells 2012; Blattman 2009; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009). But doing so may be less problematic in our case. For one, we rely only on the self-reported violence suffered by the first-generation respondents who actually lived through it,[19] not their descendants. We also use a very specific question – on the deaths of close relatives during and shortly after the deportation – to measure the intensity of victimization. In most interviews, this question elicited very specific stories about the individual relatives the respondent lost and the circumstances of their deaths. Although traumatic memories are always subjective (Caruth 1995) – and we cannot completely rule out systematic biases – we think our measure is as reliable as such measures can be.

Our survey also asked additional questions about the violence of the deportation experience. We asked whether any of the respondent's close relatives had been shot or arrested by Soviet authorities and whether they had relatives who grew up in an orphanage or who had gone missing. While these items measure other types of violence suffered by Crimean Tatars, they are less reliable measures of victimization. Individuals could have been arrested or prosecuted by the Soviet regime for actual crimes, like murder or theft, unconnected with their status as deportees. We also discovered over the course of fieldwork that it was not uncommon for parents to place their children in orphanages because they could not afford to clothe or feed them, and that this experience was not always traumatic because parents and children remained

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[19] Some of our first-generation respondents were young children during the deportation. But limiting our analysis to those families whose first-generation respondent was at least 10 years old in 1944 does not substantively change our results (see online appendix).

in regular contact. Finally, Crimean Tatars went missing because they were unused to the local environment and weather conditions, circumstances that deportees rarely blamed on the Soviet state. We tried several alternative composite and single-item measures of the intensity of victimization using these items; on the whole, our key results hold irrespective of which measure of violent repression we use (see online appendix). We chose to use just the single item on close relatives' deaths both because of its reliability and because it is a kind of violence – unlike the others we tapped – that generalizes far beyond this case to a way in which many people around the world are victimized by political actors.

Were the differing intensities of victimization suffered by Crimean Tatars indeed assigned exogenously, as we have argued? If so, our measure of victimization should not correlate with any pre-deportation characteristics that are likely to affect current attitudes and behaviors. We asked our first-generation respondents about their family prior to deportation in order to validate the exogeneity of the violence we analyze. In particular, we asked respondents about the wealth of their family prior to deportation, their relatives' religiosity, their elders' political attitudes toward the Soviet Union, and whether anyone in their family had been dekulakized.[20] Although historical accounts suggest that the kind of violence we study was exogenous to these pre-deportation characteristics, one could imagine that the Soviets might have treated some Crimean Tatars more harshly because of their political views, their wealth, or their religiosity.

Figure 1 suggests that our assumption of exogeneity is sound. When we regress our measure of violent victimization on these pre-deportation variables, we find no statistically

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[20] Dekulakization was the 1930s Soviet campaign of arrests and executions of relatively affluent peasants and their families (see Pohl 1997).

significant correlations and no particularly large estimated effects. For ease of interpretation, this and subsequent figures shows the effect of shifting each variable along its interquartile range – that is, changing its value from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Because our measures come from survey items with different response scales or from factored indexes, we report effects in terms of standard deviations for comparability. Figure 1 shows how the interquartile range of each pre-deportation variable affects the intensity of victimization variable in terms of standard deviations of change. In this instance, all the relationships are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

[Figure 1 about here]

To test our argument, our survey included items that measure the kinds of social identities and perceptions that we expect to be shaped by the trauma of losing close relatives during the deportation. We asked respondents a series of questions to determine the intensity of their attachment to the Crimean Tatars as a social group, their association of that group with victimhood, and their perception of the threat posed by Russia. We measure their in-group attachment as the difference between how trusting they are of other Crimean Tatars and how trusting they are of ethnic Russians. To measure the degree to which victimhood is part of their social identity, we asked whether they believed Crimean Tatars were victims of the Soviet state. Finally, we measured threat perception by asking respondents whether they began to feel fear when Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and what they feared.[21] We expect these three variables to take on higher values among those first-generation respondents who experienced

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[21] The threat perception variable is measured on a four-point scale that runs from no fear (0) to fear of inter-ethnic disturbances (1) to fear of possible targeted suspension of civil and political rights (2) to fear of deportation and mass arrests (3).

greater victimization. We also expect higher values on these measures of social attachment and threat perception to persist across generations.

We hypothesize that in-group attachment, threat perception, and feelings of victimization affect contemporary political attitudes and behaviors of the grandchildren of respondents who were more victimized. In particular, we expect that higher values on these variables will lead the grandchildren of those more intensely victimized to be more politically engaged, embrace more radical interpretations of Islam, be more protective of Crimean Tatar political interests, and more hostile toward the Russian state. We employ various survey questions to measure each of these concepts and, where possible, construct indexes using multiple items.[22]

To measure political engagement, we constructed three indexes: one set asking respondents about their participation in political activities in the last 12 months, another set asking them if they would be willing to participate in these activities, and a final set asking whether they participated in recent elections – the referendum on Crimea's annexation in March 2014 and the local election in September 2014. To explore attitudes toward radical Islam, we combined respondents' attitudes toward Sharia law; their views about Hizb ut-Tahrir, a Central Asian radical Islamist organization that has been active among Crimean Tatars; and their attitudes toward the radical Wahhabi movement within Sunni Islam. To quantify support for Crimean Tatar political issues, we constructed an index of feeling thermometers regarding three prominent Crimean Tatar political leaders (Mustafa Dzhemilev, Refat Chubarov, and Remzi Il'iasov),[23] we measured whether respondents celebrate the Crimean Tatar Flag Day on June 26,

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[22] In order to reduce measurement error, where possible we included multiple items in our survey to capture the same latent attitude (Achen 1975). In our analysis, we combine these items into factored indexes rather than assigning them arbitrary weights. Details on the factoring are provided in the online appendix.

[23] Mustafa Dzhemilev was a Soviet dissident and long-time head of the Mejlis (Assembly) of the Crimean Tatar People. Refat Chubarov is Dzhemilev's successor as the Mejlis leader. Remzi Il'iasov is the current deputy speaker of Crimea's regional parliament and the most prominent pro-Russian Crimean Tatar politician. Interestingly, our

and we identified respondents who said they opposed marriages between Crimean Tatars and other ethnicities.

Finally, we developed four measures of attitudes toward Russia: one based on whether the respondent said that Chechens fighting the Russian state were freedom fighters and not radicals, a second examining whether they supported the annexation of Crimea by Russia, an index based on whether a respondent said she celebrates Soviet holidays – the Day of the Protector of the Fatherland (February 23) and Victory Day (May 9), and an index of pro-Russia vote choices in the annexation referendum and the September 2014 local election. Our expectation is that third-generation respondents whose ancestor was more victimized will be more politically engaged, more supportive of the Crimean Tatar political community, and more hostile toward Russia, and that these effects will be mediated by the identities and perceptions transmitted to them via the family.

Ancestor Victimization, Political Attitudes, and Behavior

Our analysis proceeds in three stages. We begin by testing the central claim of our argument, whether the victimization of first-generation respondents affects the attitudes and behavior of their grandchildren. We then work back through the causal chain to examine how persistent political attitudes are formed and transmitted. As the first step in that process, we explore whether political violence affects the identities and perceptions of direct victims, the first generation in our sample. Next, we examine whether there is evidence that these identities are transmitted from generation to generation within families. Finally, we study how political

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factor analysis demonstrates that Crimean Tatars do not distinguish in their support between Dzhemilev and Chubarov on the one hand (both banned from entering Crimea by Russian authorities in 2014) and Il'iasov on the other (a collaborator with Russian authorities).

identities passed down within families mediate between first-generation victimization and third-generation political attitudes and behavior.

We posited that the first generation's experience of political violence affects the third generation's attitudes and behavior. We expected that victims' descendants would be more politically engaged, more likely to stand up for the rights of their group, and more vehemently opposed to the perpetrator state. Is there empirical support for these propositions? The results of our analyses linking ancestral exposure to political violence and contemporary attitudes and behavior are summarized in Figure 2.[24] As before, these figures report the effect of shifting the intensity of victimization along the interquartile range on each measure of political attitudes and behavior, expressed in terms of standard deviations.

We find that the intensity of victimization of the first generation substantially shapes the behavior and attitudes of their grandchildren. An interquartile shift in the intensity of victimization changes most of our outcomes by between a quarter and a half of a standard deviation. These are impressive effects. In a normally distributed variable, 68% of the variation lies within one standard deviation, 95% within two standard deviations. It seems quite remarkable that something people experienced 70 years ago changes their grandchildren's attitudes by a quarter of a standard deviation. All of the effects, except for the impact of first-generation victimization on third-generation's views about radical Islam, are statistically different from zero. All in all, political participation and political choice, attitudes toward

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[24] Note that in the analyses in Figure 2, all of the grandchildren of a particular first-generation respondent are assigned the same value on victimization. In other words, we measure the effect of the victimization reported by the grandparent, regardless of whether the grandchild is aware of that victimization. Note also that our sample design means that we do not know the intensity with which the other grandparents of each third-generation respondent were victimized. This means that we are underestimating the true intergenerational effects of victimization because we are assuming that a third-generation respondent's other grandparents did not lose close relatives during and shortly after deportation.

Russia, and in-group attachment are all affected by the level of political violence that the respondent's family had been exposed to some seventy years prior.

[Figure 2 about here]

Beginning at the top of the figure, we see that first-generation victimization strengthens third-generation descendants' attachment to their ethnic group, makes them more likely to self-identify as victims in the present, and to perceive Russian authorities as threatening. Third-generation respondents with more intensely victimized ancestors are also consistently more politically engaged than their peers. Those from more intensely victimized families both report more political activity in the past and a stronger willingness to participate in political activities in the future. They are more likely to have voted in the Russia-backed Crimea referendum of March 2014 and in the local elections of September 2014. Interestingly, third-generation Crimean Tatars from more intensely victimized families were more likely to participate in these elections even though the Crimean Tatar community generally boycotted both of these political events, especially the March referendum.[25]

To our surprise, we did not find that victims' descendants are more radical in their views as Muslims by comparison to peers from non-victimized families. This is likely due to the fact that the form of Islam practiced by the Crimean Tatars is very secular and tolerant, so much so that even a family grievance against state authorities does not result in religious radicalization. It might well be that the kind of religious radicalization that shook Russia's North Caucasus republics in the 1990s in the process bringing about a bloody civil war is not an immediate danger among the

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[25] In our sample, 7% of respondents said they voted in the March 2014 referendum, as compared to the official overall turnout rate of 80%.; 26% of our respondents said they voted in the September 2014 local elections by comparison to an official overall turnout rate of 45%.

Crimean Tatars, or at least those members of this community who, theoretically, ought to be most susceptible to radicalization.

When it comes to attitudes toward issues facing the Crimean Tatar community, young Crimean Tatars from victimized families are significantly more supportive of their group. The descendants of victims are more likely to support Crimean Tatar political leaders, more likely to celebrate the Crimean Tatar Flag Day, and more opposed to the idea of family members marrying outside of the Crimean Tatar community.

Some of the most interesting findings, and also ones with largest effects, concern attitudes toward Russia, which is viewed by the Crimean Tatars as successor state to the repressive system that systematically perpetrated violence against their community. In a sign that victims' descendants are especially motivated to fight against the perpetrator state, a shift on first-generation victimization along the interquartile range increases third-generation respondents' support for Chechen and Dagestani separatists by nearly half a standard deviation. Like Chechens and Dagestanis, Crimean Tatars are also Muslim, and this division within the Crimean Tatar community over the legitimacy of the North Caucasus insurgency suggests a possible source of tensions between the Crimean Tatars and Russian authorities. Likewise, third-generation respondents from families especially victimized by the deportation are less likely to approve of Russia's annexation of Crimea. They are also less likely to celebrate such centerpiece Soviet holidays as the Fatherland Defenders' Day (23 February) and Victory Day (9 May). Although they are more likely to turn out in elections, they are also more likely to vote for positions and parties that are hostile to dominant positions embraced by the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea. In the referendum on Crimea's future, respondents from victimized families

were more likely to vote for Crimea remaining in Ukraine, and in the local election they were

voting in higher numbers for parties other than United Russia.

Young Crimean Tatars whose ancestors were victimized in 1944-45 are today

substantially different when it comes to social and political preferences and behaviors from their

peers from families that were lucky enough to escape political violence. This is particularly

surprising because they themselves have had no personal experience with the Soviet state or any

state repression.

Tracing Family Transmission

First-generation victimization continues to influence descendants' political attitudes and

behavior ranging from threat perception to voter choice. But what are the mechanisms that

connect these two phenomena? We begin by examining the connection between victimization

experiences and core political attitudes that shape victim identities – self-identification with

one's ethnic group, self-perception as a victim, and heightened threat perception – among first-

generation respondents. Our results are reported in Figure 3. We find consistently strong effects

of victimization on these core political identities and perceptions.

[Figure 3 about here]

To determine how these effects persist, we need to know whether these core political

attitudes are transmitted across generations. Figure 4 demonstrates that they are. In this figure,

we separately examine the transmission of in-group attachment, self-identification as victim of

the political system, and perception of the state as a threat, between first- and second-generation

respondents, second and third generations, and first and third generations. Transmission appears

to be strongest between immediately adjacent generations – first to second and second to third –

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although it is also present when we bypass a generation and look at transmission from grandparents directly to grandchildren. Self-identification as a victim is most strongly transmitted between the first generation, who had personal experience of political violence, and their descendants in both subsequent generations. In contrast, the second generation appears to be most effective at transmitting in-group attachment to their offspring. Consistent with many studies of family socialization, we find clear evidence that identities and threat perceptions persist across generations.

[Figure 4 about here]

These estimates, of course, are simply correlations. A major challenge in studies of family socialization is that it can be difficult to distinguish socialization from the fact that parents and their children tend to resemble each other in other ways. We may observe that individuals and their offspring hold similarly strong political identities. But this could be because parents and their children tend to be in the same social class and live in similar geographic areas. They may identify in similar ways, but that may be because they arrived at the same identities independently. However, ours is a particularly good case for inferring family transmission since the second and third generations in our sample did not inherent wealth or status from their ancestors because of the Soviet rupture. Thus, there are good reasons – stronger than in most studies of family socialization – to think that the persistence of identities and threat perception in these cases is the result of family transmission.[26]

To establish how these legacies of political violence get transmitted across generations, we would ideally like to show that the contemporary attitudes and behaviors of these third-

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[26] We set aside for now the question of how identity and threat perception are transmitted within families. Our survey asked a series of questions about whether respondents discussed the deportation experience with their ancestors. We also asked second- and third-generation respondents about their perceptions of their ancestors' experiences. We intend to analyze these data in a separate paper.

generation respondents are the products of the identities and threat perceptions they inherited

from their victimized ancestors. Identifying this mechanism requires engaging in mediation

analysis. In Tables 1 and 2, we engage in implicit mediation analysis, tests whether including a

hypothesized mediating variable into a regression attenuates the relationship between the key

independent and dependent variables.[27] But causal mediation analysis is fraught with logical and

empirical challenges (Gerber and Green 2012; Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010), so our results

should be considered suggestive rather than conclusive.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

We find that the effect of ancestor victimization on each of our measures of

contemporary attitudes and behaviors is substantially, if not entirely, mediated by inherited

political identities and threat perception. The effect of victimization on political engagement

seems most consistently mediated by threat perception, though in-group attachment and

victimhood seem to mediate some effects. The inherited variables do not mediate the entire

effect of victimization on our two measures of political participation, but they do seem to

mediate some of the effect. The effect of victimization on Crimean Tatar issue positions seems

most consistently mediated by in-group attachment, though victimhood and threat perception

also appear to play some role. And these inherited variables appear to fully account for the effect

of victimization. Finally, contemporary attitudes toward Russia seem consistently mediated by

victimhood and threat perception, though sometimes also in-group attachment. Most of the

effect of ancestor victimization on these attitudes appears to be mediated by the inherited

identities and threat perception, except in the case of support for Chechen rebels. Although this

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[27] Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010) offer an alternative method for measuring mediation effects. We intend to use their method to verify our results in the next iteration of our paper.

evidence is merely suggestive, it generally points in the expected direction: the political identities and threat perception that third-generation respondent inherit from their more intensely victimized grandparents affects their political engagement, their attitudes about Crimean Tatar political issues, and their attitudes toward Russia.

The Legacy of Political Violence and the Family

Violence has lasting legacies that shape political attitudes and behaviors across generations. Our multigenerational survey of Crimean Tatars reveals that political violence not only shapes the political identities and perceptions of victims – as previous scholars have found – but that these are also transmitted to their descendants through the family. In turn, these identities and perceptions shape the political attitudes and behaviors of descendants of victims of political violence. Crimean Tatars whose ancestors suffered additional violence beyond deportation are today more politically engaged, more supportive of the community's position on issues, and more hostile towards Russia. Even though the violence we study was perpetrated over 70 years ago, it still substantially affects political views. These findings have important implications for how we think about transitional justice and may help to explain why we sometimes see polities enter into cycles of violence. They also bring together, for the first time, research on political violence with the growing body of work on historical legacies.

Our finds are also likely to apply far beyond the population we study here. Although we focus on Crimean Tatars and the deportation of 1944-45, these kinds of events are all too common. Deportations like those of the Crimean Tatars were quite common across Europe during World War II. Our study focused on the death of a close relative at the hands of a political actor. And that kind of victimization is common during conflicts and within

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authoritarian regimes, and spreads across both time and space.[28] Although we cannot rule out

the possibility that there is something peculiar about the population and the context we study –

after all, all populations and contexts are at some level unique – we see little a priori reason to

think that our findings from this population do not travel. But only further research will be able

to tell us conclusively.

This study also offers an innovative method for studying the effects of political violence.

The challenge facing scholarship in this field is that violence is often systematically targeted.

That makes it difficult for scholars to make inferences about the consequences of political

violence. Our study highlights that even in cases where some violence is systematic (the

deportation of all Crimean Tatars), additional forms of violence may be meted out in arbitrary

and plausibly exogenous ways (the death of close relatives during and shortly after the

deportation). By comparing more and less intense exposure to violence among people who were

all deported, we are able to identify its causal effects. This method could be used to study other

instances of violence among other populations. In civil wars, combatants may systematically

target certain communities, but perpetuate violence within them indiscriminately. During the

1947 Partition of British India, millions of people were systematically displaced, but soldiers are

said to have shot into rail cars erratically as they rode by. Scholars should study these exogenous

variations in the intensity of violence to help us understand the effects of political violence.

The growing body of research on the effects of political violence has largely failed to

study its legacies on individual attitudes and behaviors. And research on historical legacies has

also overlooked the important role of families in transmitting legacies from generation to

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[28] It is, moreover, a kind of violence that is far more generalized than those studied by some prior research, such as child soldiering (Blattman 2009).

generation. Even more broadly, most research on political behavior analyzes atomized

individuals whose identities, perceptions, and preferences derive from their own personal

experiences or attributes. But this paper demonstrates that studying intergenerational effects on

attitudes and behavior can yield important insights. As more and more scholars become

interested in studying historical legacies, we will need to turn to individual-level evidence to

understand how historical legacies persist over time. Family socialization is only one of several

mechanisms by which identities and perceptions can be transmitted, but it is one that has so far

been overlooked.

We are not the first to highlight the important role of family transmission on political

identities. But existing studies of family socialization in political science have so far been

limited to the advanced democracies and focused almost exclusively on partisan identities. In

fact, this study represents one of the first multigenerational surveys of political attitudes

conducted in the developing world. A whole host of experiences that are uncommon in

advanced democracies – including political violence – are therefore missing from this body of

work. Even so, we still know little about what kinds of identities and perceptions parents

transmit to their children, how parents' personal experiences affect the political identities of their

children, and how family transmission works. These unanswered questions are hugely important

if we are to continue to build our understanding of political attitudes and behavior.

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Figure 1. *Randomization checks*

Notes: Values represent changes in the degree of victimization, based on shifting each variable from its sample 25th to 75th percentile, with all other variables held at their sample means. These predicted effects are expressed in standard deviations of our measure of victimization. Solid lines show the simulated 95% confidence interval. Black dots represent values that are significant at 95% confidence, white dots those that fall short of that threshold. These predicted values are based on the regression model presented in Appendix Table A2 (*N=252, R²=0.013*).

Figure 2. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation attitudes and behavior*

Notes: Values represent changes in the magnitude of each dependent variable, based on shifting the degree of victimization from its sample 25th to 75th percentile. These predicted effects are expressed in standard deviations of the dependent variable. Solid lines show the simulated 95% confidence interval. Black dots represent values that are significant at 95% confidence, white dots those that fall short of that threshold. These predicted values are based on the regression models presented in Appendix Table A3.

Figure 3. *Effects of victimization on attitudes among first generation*

Effect of victimization (in SD)

Notes: Values represent changes in the magnitude of each dependent variable, based on shifting the degree of victimization from its sample 25th to 75th percentile. These predicted effects are expressed in standard deviations of the dependent variable. Solid lines show the simulated 95% confidence interval. Black dots represent values that are significant at 95% confidence, white dots those that fall short of that threshold. These predicted values are based on the regression models presented in Appendix Table A4.

Figure 4. *Intergenerational persistence of victimization effects*

Notes: Values represent proportion of variation that is similar across pairs of generations. Solid lines show the simulated 95% confidence interval. All estimates are statistically significant at 95% confidence. These estimates are based on the regression models presented in Appendix Table A5.

Table 1. *Implicit mediation analysis*

Independent variable	Political engagement			Crimean Tatar issues		
	Past participation	**Willingness to participate**	**Turnout**	**Support CT leaders**	**Celebrate CT holiday**	**Oppose mixed marriages**
In-group attachment	-0.020	0.181[*]	0.266[*]	0.399[*]	0.151[*]	0.262[*]
	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.042)	(0.061)
Victimhood	0.351[*]	0.008	0.514[*]	0.260[*]	-0.036	0.397[*]
	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.044)	(0.064)
Threat perception	0.104[*]	0.180[*]	0.122[*]	0.254[*]	0.017	0.082[*]
	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.015)	(0.026)
First-generation victimization	0.294[*]	0.277[*]	0.127	0.320	0.081	0.091
	(0.130)	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.166)	(0.066)	(0.090)
Observations	746	564	738	547	707	729
Families	281	258	281	254	280	275
R^2	0.062	0.070	0.112	0.177	0.039	0.162

[*] $p<0.05$
Notes: Regression estimates with standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table 2. *Implicit mediation analysis, continued*

Independent variable	Attitudes toward Russia			
	Support Chechen rebels	**Support annexation**	**Celebrate Soviet holidays**	**Pro-Russia vote choice**
In-group attachment	0.044	-0.158*	-0.320*	-0.229*
	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.065)	(0.082)
Victimhood	-0.097*	-0.331*	-0.439*	-0.474*
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.086)
Threat perception	0.113*	-0.164*	-0.086*	-0.198*
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.028)
First-generation victimization	0.243*	-0.113	-0.178	-0.048
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.116)	(0.154)
Observations	488	622	746	723
Families	243	257	281	275
R^2	0.120	0.365	0.175	0.118

* p<0.05

Notes: Regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A1. *Survey sample characteristics, by generation*

Variable	First generation	Second generation	Third generation
Male (%)	33.7	50.3	49.5
Urban (%)	22.0	27.8	34.0
Age (average)	80	51	25
Education (%)			
Incomplete primary	43.4	0.8	0.6
Elementary	23.1	1.3	5.2
General middle	15.7	22.8	27.0
Special middle	8.4	38.8	28.1
Professional technical	3.7	17.3	11.9
Incomplete higher	1.7	2.0	9.3
Higher	4.0	16.8	17.9

Table A2. *Randomization checks*

Pre-treatment variables	Victimization
Pre-Soviet household wealth	0.014
	(0.023)
Dekulakized	0.008
	(0.047)
Soviet opposition	0.034
	(0.028)
Pre-Soviet religiosity	-0.047
	(0.037)
Observations	252
Pseudo-R^2	0.013

[*] $p<0.05$

Notes: Regression estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant term not shown.

Table A3. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation attitudes and behavior*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R^2
In-group attachment	0.173[*]	0.065	957	298	0.015
Victimhood	0.615[*]	0.184	801	286	0.020
Threat perception	0.316[*]	0.161	968	298	0.006
Political engagement					
Past participation	0.239[*]	0.120	996	298	0.007
Willingness to participate	0.360[*]	0.131	727	287	0.015
Turnout	0.318[*]	0.125	974	298	0.012
Radical Islam	0.028	0.174	645	267	0.000
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.535[*]	0.149	724	285	0.032
Celebrate CT holiday	0.115[*]	0.058	947	297	0.009
Oppose mixed marriages	0.202[*]	0.093	962	298	0.009
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support Chechen rebels	0.855[*]	0.186	639	270	0.037
Support annexation	-0.574[*]	0.208	778	285	0.018
Celebrate Soviet holidays	-0.322[*]	0.109	996	298	0.019
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.266[*]	0.132	964	296	0.008

[*] $p < 0.05$

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A4. *Effects of victimization on attitudes among first generation*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs	R^2
In-group attachment	0.243[*]	0.084	283	0.027
Victimhood	0.231[*]	0.093	224	0.027
Threat perception	0.467[*]	0.219	281	0.016

[*] $p<0.05$

Notes: Regression estimates with robust standard errors. Constant terms not shown.

Table A5. *Intergenerational persistence of victimization effects*

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Obs.	Families	R^2
1G-2G Transmission					
In-group attachment	0.344*	0.047	549	283	0.132
Victimhood	0.551*	0.046	396	217	0.304
Threat perception	0.358*	0.044	545	282	0.146
2G-3G Transmission					
In-group attachment	0.421*	0.035	933	569	0.176
Victimhood	0.398*	0.038	701	440	0.158
Threat perception	0.328*	0.035	916	560	0.131
1G-3G Transmission					
In-group attachment	0.329*	0.040	917	285	0.123
Victimhood	0.385*	0.048	660	223	0.149
Threat perception	0.256*	0.039	912	283	0.092

* $p < 0.05$
Notes: Regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Appendix B: Survey question wording

Pre-Soviet household wealth: "Prior to deportation, some families were wealthy; others poor. What type of property from the list below did your close relatives own? (a) House, (b) Some agricultural land, (c) A lot of agricultural land, (d) An orchard, (e) Some pasture animals, (f) A lot of pasture animals, (g) A horse drawn carriage, (h) Other substantial property, e.g. tobacco fields, a smithery, a winery." Factored index.[1]

Dekulakized: "Were your close relatives subject to dekulakization?" (0) No; (1) Yes.

Soviet opposition: "Prior to deportation, did your close relatives privately support or oppose Soviet authorities, not in public but within the family circle?" (0) They supported Soviet authorities; (1) They were indifferent towards them, (2) They opposed Soviet authorities.

Pre-Soviet religiosity: "How important was it for your family to follow Islamic customs and traditions?" (0) Not important; (1) Somewhat important; (2) Very important.

Violent victimization: "Did any family members die during the train journey to the deportation destination or shortly afterwards?" (0) No, no family members died; (1) Yes, one family member died; (2) Yes, 2 or 3 family members died; (3) Yes, 4 or more family members died.

In-group attachment: "Some people say that all Crimean Tatars can be trusted; others disagree. Do you trust all Crimean Tatars / Russians, most, only some, or none?" (0) Trust none; (1) Trust only some; (2) Trust majority; (3) Trust all. Our variable takes the difference between trust in Crimean Tatars and trust in Russians.

Victimhood: "Do you consider yourself or your relatives to be victims of the Russian political system today?" (0) No; (1) Yes.

Fear of persecution: "Some Crimean Tatars started to fear concerning their future after the March referendum. Did you start to feel fear?" (0) No. "What do you most fear today?" (1) Conflicts between ethnicities; (2) Limitations in rights; (3) Deportation or mass arrests.

Past participation: "63. Please look at the list below. Did you engage in any civic activities over the past 12 months? Select all answers that apply: (a) Discussed political issues with family and friends, (b) participated in an event commemorating the Crimean Tatar deportation (18 May), (c) Participated in other protests or demonstrations (other than 18 May)." Factored index.[2]

Willingness to participate: "People participate in politics in different ways. Now I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take. Please tell me whether you might

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[1] Eigenvalue = 1.58, Cronbach's alpha = 0.39.

[2] Eigenvalue = 1.32, Cronbach's alpha = 0.33. The factor loadings are discussion = 0.58, May 18 = 0.72, other demonstrations = 0.68.

do it or would never do it: (a) Signing petitions, (b) Attending peaceful demonstrations, (c) Joining strikes." (0) Would never do this; (1) Might do this. Factored index.[3]

Turnout: "As you know, on 16 March 2014, Crimea held a referendum on secession from Ukraine. Did you participate in the referendum?" (0) No; (1) Yes. "In September of this year, local elections took place in Crimea in accordance with Russian rules. Did you participate in that election?" (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.[4]

Support for radical Islam: "Imagine that in 10 years there is an independent Crimean Tatar state. Should it be a secular state or one run under Sharia law?" (0) Secular state; (1) Under Sharia law. "What is your attitude toward Hizb ut-Tahrir?" (1) Positive; (0) Neither; (-1) Negative. "What is your attitude toward the Wahhabi movement in Islam?" (1) Positive; (0) Neither; (-1) Negative. Factored index.[5]

Support for CT leaders: "Could you please tell me how much you personally support the following politicians: (a) Mustafa Dzhemilev, (b) Refat Chubarov, (c) Remi Il'iasov?" (0) Do not support at all; (1) Do not support; (2) Support; (3) Support completely. Factored index.[6]

Celebrate CT holiday: "Do you observe the following commemorative dates? Day of the Crimean Tatar flag (26 June)? (0) No; (1) Yes.

Oppose mixed marriages: "Some Crimean Tatar families are completely opposed to mixed marriages, whereas others support them. How would you react to your child wanting to marry someone who is not an ethnic Crimean Tatar?" (0) Supportive; (1) Indifferent; (2) Opposed.

Support Chechen rebels: "Some people say that Chechens and Dagestanis who are fighting against Russia are radicals; others say that these people are freedom fighters. Do you think Chechens and Dagestanis who are fighting against Russia are radicals or freedom fighters?" (0) Radicals; (1) Freedom fighters.

Support annexation: "Do you support Russia's annexation of Crimea in principle?" (0) No; (1) Yes.

Celebrate Soviet holidays: "Do you observe the following commemorative dates: (a) Day of the protector of the fatherland (23 Feb), (b) Victory Day (9 May)?" (0) No; (1) Yes. Additive index.

Pro-Russia vote choice: "As you know, on 16 March 2014, Crimea held a referendum on secession from Ukraine. Did you participate in the referendum? How did you vote? Remember that all your answers are completely confidential." (0) In favor of autonomy within Ukraine,

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[3] Eigenvalue = 2.08, Cronbach's alpha = 0.78. The factor loadings are petitions = 0.81, demonstrations = 0.88, strikes = 0.81.

[4] Eigenvalue = 1.36, Cronbach's alpha = 0.46. The factor loadings are 0.82.

[5] Eigenvalue = 1.79, Cronbach's alpha = 0.67. The factor loadings are Sharia = 0.53, Hizb = 0.87, Wahhabi = 0.86.

[6] Eigenvalue = 2.04; Cronbach's alpha = 0.76. The factor loadings are Dzhemilev = 0.90, Chubarov = 0.93, Il'iasov = 0.60.

spoiled ballot; (1) In favor of unification with Russia. "Which political party did you vote for?" (0) Fair Russia, Liberal Democrats, Communists, or blank/spoiled ballot; (1) United Russia. Factored index.[7]

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[7] Eigenvalue = 1.46; Cronbach's alpha = 0.60. The factor loadings are 0.85.