

EL MAL MENOR

NEGATIVE PARTISANSHIP IN PERU: THE CASES OF ANTI APRISMO AND
ANTI FUJIMORISMO

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1.1 Introduction

In May of 2009,¹ the Nobel Prize winner and political factotum, Mario Vargas Llosa, proclaimed: “I don’t think my compatriots would be so foolish as to force us to choose between AIDS and terminal cancer, a dilemma that represents the hypothetical presidential run-off between Ollanta Humala and Keiko Fujimori”. Despite his doubts, these very candidates eventually faced off in the 2011 presidential election two years later. Ultimately, Vargas Llosa’s anti-fujimorismo was stronger than his anti-militarism; he ended up supporting former lieutenant Ollanta Humala against former First Lady Keiko Fujimori.² In his personal evaluation, Humala was the “lesser of two evils,” and in support of him, Vargas Llosa offered himself as the “guarantor of democracy” during Humala’s tenure.

Vargas Llosa’s description of this electoral preference is not uncommon among Peruvians. Often, the selection of Peruvian political candidates revolves around “el mal menor” (the lesser evil). This vote-choice strategy is not rare in politics. However, it plays a decisive role in Peru because of the country’s weak political parties that lack social roots in Peruvian society. These characteristics lead to a system based on charismatic appeals and the distrust of politicians. As a result, the electorate chooses the “least bad” political candidates based on the intensities of its political antipathies. Where political linkages are weak or nonexistent, pragmatism predominates (especially in ballotage systems).

However, the process of selecting the “least bad” option is based on established references. Although aprismo and fujimorismo are neither

¹ El Comercio, Política, *Vargas Llosa compara a Keiko Fujimori y Ollanta Humala con el sida y el cancer*. Date of access: 12/01/2015. Link: <http://elcomercio.pe/politica/gobierno/vargas-llosa-compara-ollanta-humala-keiko-fujimori-sida-cancer-noticia-290414>

² When the President is single or divorced, normally his daughter assumes the role of First Lady. That is the function that Keiko Fujimori assumed since April 1994 to November 2000, after Alberto Fujimori separated from his ex wife Susana Higuchi.

institutionalized nor socially vibrant political parties, they have developed “surviving” and “nascent” partisanships, respectively (Meléndez 2015). These “positive” political identities have “negative” correlates: “anti aprismo” and “anti fujimorismo” represent complementary political identities that guide political attitudes and behavior and, as I plan to demonstrate in this paper, are crucial indicators of electoral preferences.

Many historians argue that 20th century Peruvian politics can be characterized as a struggle between aprismo and anti-aprismo (Neira 1997; Manrique 2009), the former pursuing access to power and the latter impeding it. Conservative and military sectors organically articulated a radical opposition to aprismo. When a leader of APRA finally became president of Peru in 1985, anti aprismo assumed a different opposition. Alan Garcia’s failed administration produced new antagonism in the lower classes, the group most affected by hyperinflation and corruption during his term as president (Reyna 2000).

In comparison, Fujimorismo is a relatively new political movement (founded in 1990) that governed Peru for a decade based on a coalition between the military and economic elite (Crabtree 1999). However, its anti-establishment and authoritarian government in the 1990s increased the probability of an active opposition. In the late 1990s, anti-fujimorista opposition groups (largely the middle classes and remnants of Peru’s traditional parties) formed alliances with regional social movements to challenge the authoritarian regime (Cotler and Grompone 2000). They played a role in Fujimori’s decline and dominated the transition to a fully democratic regime, attempting to exclude fujimorismo from the political arena during the early 2000s (Marcus-Delgado and Tanaka 2001). Fujimorismo’s unexpected electoral revival in the 2006 national elections –with Alberto Fujimori in jail– suggests that the

fujimorismo / antifujimorismo dichotomy is a relevant political divide in contemporary Peruvian politics.

In this paper, I present the first systematic evidence regarding two important negative (“anti”) identities in contemporary Peru: anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo. Employing an original measurement of the political identifications in the context of party system collapse, I identify the ideological coherence of these anti-identifications and their power to predict vote choice. The evidence suggests that, in scenarios of post party system collapse, anti-identities are effective “party –substitutes” in the “selection choice” party-function (Aldrich, 1995).

1.2 What is a negative identity?

Although the seminal studies of electoral behavior propose that party identifications can be negative as well as positive (Campbell et al. 1960), the concept is treated regularly as a positive construct. Negative party identifications are a “forgotten side” (Medeiros and Noel 2013) of the connections between party elites and citizens. Only a few works have explored this phenomenon under post-communists systems (Rose and Mishler 1998) and in the case of Argentina (Ostiguy 1999). However, their existence may have significant consequences in electoral behavior, especially in a context where positive party identifications are scarce.

There are theoretical reasons to treat positive and negative partisanship separately. First, they are not simply bipolar opposites. In their study of negative partisanship in Commonwealth democracies, Medeiros and Noel (2013) found that negative party identification seems more related to ideology and generally not influenced by ethnic identity. Also, negative partisanship may be more powerful than positive identifications (Baumeister et al., n.d.), and may have different consequences

(Zhong et al. 2008). Consequently, negative party identification has an autonomous and coherent structure.

Negative party identity is defined as an individual's sustained refusal to vote for a particular party (Medeiros and Noel 2013) . It has an autonomous role in politics and an independent effect on vote choice. As such negative party identification should coalesce around ideological and/or group identity appeals, should be predicted by an ideology, and should act as an efficient determinant of vote choice, elements that Medeiros and Noel (2013) have successfully identified in stable two-party systems.

In multi-party systems, however, negative partisan identifications may not have a natural or even easily apparent counterpart. Also, if political parties are volatile, it may be difficult to cultivate loyal followers, let alone generate stable opposition. In this sense, post-collapse party system scenarios –ephemeral political parties, untrusted political leaders, political disaffection at the individual level- are unexpected arenas for the formation of any type of party identification, be it positive or negative. However, I argue that both types of party identities have developed in Peru: APRA (surviving partisan identity) and Fujimorismo (nascent partisan identity) have developed negative counterparts (Meléndez 2015). Anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo are relevant, negative identities that have emerged in the Peruvian political system and successfully order electoral (and non-electoral) politics within a context of weak party institutionalization. Unexpectedly, it appears the weakly institutionalized nature of the Peruvian party system increases the relevance of these negative identities.

1.3 Measurement

I propose to capture intense opposition –a negative identity- to a surviving partisan identification (aprismo) and to a nascent partisan identification (fujimorismo).³ Although they are easily recognizable in Peruvian politics, no previous research has attempted to measure antiaprismo and antifujimorismo systematically at the individual level. As explained in the previous work, I conceptualize aprismo and fujimorismo as intermediate forms of partisanship that fall between the absence of party identification (no sympathies with a political organization) and the consolidation of party identification (an institutionalized political party). These partial partisanships are strong enough to produce anti-identifications due to the absence of stronger partisan identities in Peru's post-collapse scenario (Melendez, mimeo).

Questions regarding anti-party identities are often included in electoral surveys. Respondents are asked whether they would “never vote” for a particular political party (or candidate). The wording of these questions varies depending on the context (one-party system, two-party system or multi-party system). Some variants ask where there is “any party you would never vote for” or ask respondents to “identify the names of all the parties that you would never vote for” (Rose and Mishler 1998) . Another alternative asks whether individuals have “unfavorable thoughts and feeling” regarding a specific political party. Although these measurements are pertinent, they assume that party systems are structured around institutionalized political parties. In contexts where parties are weak and party identifications are still emerging, it is not necessarily evident that negative identifications regarding weak positive identifications can develop.

³ Another partisan identifications (PPC, Perú Posible) have not been considered for this analysis since they are not politically relevant at the individual level, according to the specialized literature. Survey data from pollsters confirm this point (Ipsos-Apoyo).

In general, I propose an innovative measurement for recognizing partisanship as fully-fledged or as an intermediate form that, also, can deal with potential social desirability bias due to discredited partisan politics. It consists of a coherent voting record across multi-level public positions (e.g. national assemblies, regional administrations, and local authorities). In the United States, partisanship is evidenced by the temporal stability of party loyalties. However, in developing countries we lack panel data to pursue a time series analysis of the evolution of party identification. Moreover, free and fair elections are a relatively new phenomenon and therefore party attachments have had fewer opportunities to develop. In response to these challenges, I tried a different strategy in order to measure intermediate level of party identities: I ask for voting intention in hypothetical parliamentary, regional, and local elections in favor of distinct partisan candidates.

In order to get a concise behavioral measurement of intermediate party identities, I label individuals that would *definitively* vote for a candidate of the same organization (e.g. APRA, fujimorismo) in each of these three elections as “core” followers. In Lima, a district that lacks a Regional Presidency, a hardcore follower is considered an individual that would definitively vote for a particular political party in local and parliamentary elections.

Respondents that would *probably* vote for a particular organization (e.g. APRA, fujimorismo) for each of the three public positions are considered “leaning” partisans. This category includes individuals that would definitively vote for a party’s candidate in at least one public position and would probably vote for the same party in the remaining two. Once again, an exception is made for respondents in Lima that elect representatives for only local and legislative offices.

To quantify negative party identification in such systems, I develop a measure similar to the operationalization presented above. Respondents in a national poll are asked if they “would vote for an (aprista/fujimorista) candidate for National Congress, regional government and local government.” Individuals who answer they “definitely would not vote” for candidates affiliated with one of these parties in all of the public positions identified are categorized as “anti-identifiers” of that particular party. In Lima, a district that lacks a Regional Presidency, an anti-identifier is considered an individual who would definitely not vote for a particular political party in local and congressional elections.

This measurement is optimal for three reasons. First, opposition to a specific party may not necessarily imply support for another. If an individual opposes party A, she may sympathize with party B or C, or she may not sympathize with any political party. Second, it is consistent across multi-level government positions creating a “thicker” measurement capable of identifying latent “anti-identification.” Third, it is a very demanding operationalization because it is very strict to label an individual as “anti-identifier” (only those who *definitely would not* vote for a fujimorista).

For example, respondents who “would *definitely not* vote for a candidate of party A” for Congress or, but “would *probably not* vote for a candidate of party A” for Regional Government are not considered an “anti-identifier”, despite opposing the party in two of the three levels of government in question. This measurement allows us to identify a strong rejection of a particular party, which I identify as core anti-partisanship.

This set of questions was included originally in two nationally representative surveys conducted in Peru after the first round of 2011 presidential elections (related to the presence of an anti-aprista partisan identity) and after the run-off election

(related to the presence of an anti-fujimorista partisan identity). Three years later, a portion of these questions was replicated by a commercial pollster (GfK). In addition to serving as an additional source of comparison, the replicated survey is advantageous because it includes questions regarding anti aprismo and anti fujimorismo in the same questionnaire. This allows us to calculate the overlap between these negative identifiers. Results are provided in Table 1.

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGES OF NEGATIVE PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS

Negative Identifiers	2011	2014
Anti-aprista	55.00%	52.85%
Anti-fujimorista	36.56%	41.82%
Anti-aprista and Anti-fujimorista		32.33%

Source: Instituto de Opinión Pública IOP– PUCP (2011) and GfK (2014)

In both surveys, Anti-aprista is more prevalent than anti-fujimorismo. In the survey conducted in 2011, 55% of respondents would never vote for an aprista candidate. Three years later the percentage decreases slightly (52.85%), but was within the sample of error. In contrast, the percentage of respondents who would never vote for a Fujimorista candidate increased from 36.56% in 2011 to 41.82% in 2014 (despite the decrease's larger magnitude, it also does not exceed the statistical confidence interval). The 5-point increase in anti-fujimorismo respondents may be explained by the anti-fujimorista political climate that president Humala has promoted

during his tenure.⁴ In any case, similar results in different surveys conducted in 2011 and 2014 give us more confidence about the reliability of this measurement.

An important aspect of these anti-identifiers is that they can overlap. According to the 2014 survey, 32.33% of respondents are both anti-fujimorista and anti-aprista. This overlap is ideologically coherent; the surviving APRA and nascent fujimorista identifications are ideologically positioned to the right of the ideological spectrum and share political adversaries (the fragmented Left).

1.4 Negative partisanship across positive partisanships

According to Medeiros and Noel, anti-identities are rooted in an individual's positive identity with the other (second) political party. However, in fluid and multi-party systems, negative identities are not necessarily based on a positive identification with another party. The percentage of negative identifiers tends to fluctuate across parties and, obviously, is weaker (though not absent) among those that sympathize with the party in question (e.g. Aprismo, Fujimorismo). No a unique political party concentrates the intense opposition (the “antis”) to Aprismo and Fujimorismo. Unlike in an institutionalized two-party system, it is possible for negative identities to develop independently from their positive counterparts.

For example, 55% of the respondents to the 2011 survey qualified as anti-apristas. Among people who sympathized with the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP) and Fuerza Social (FS), -both left-wing organizations- anti-aprismo is higher than the general average. Among sympathizers with the PPC and Solidaridad Nacional (SN) –parties to the right of the political spectrum- anti-aprismo is lower,

⁴ For example, on November 19th, 2014 President Humala declared to the press that “Fujimorismo was born in a sewer”: <http://elcomercio.pe/politica/gobierno/ollanta-humala-dijo-que-fujimorismo-nacio-cloaca-noticia-1772660>

though not insignificant. Surprisingly, 20% of the respondents who sympathize with APRA qualified as anti-apristas⁵. That is, 20% of the APRA sympathizers (20 respondents in a sample of 1,800 individuals) do not reach statistical significant results, although Chi-square coefficients are significant for the parties with larger proportions of sympathizers (PPC, FP, PNP, non-identifiers). Regardless, the evidence shows that anti-aprismo is not concentrated around a single positive identification.

TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS THAT SYMPATHIZE WITH POLITICAL
PARTIES AND PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS THAT WOULD NEVER
VOTE FOR AN APRISTA BY EACH PARTISAN SYMPATHY

Parties	Sympathy	Anti-Aprismo
APRA	0.06	0.20
PPC	0.12	0.48
FP	0.20	0.53
PNP	0.25	0.67
SN	0.05	0.49
PP	0.07	0.54
FS	0.01	0.85
Others (minor parties)	0.01	0.50
None	0.23	0.56
DK	0.02	0.56
General		0.55

Source: IOP – PUCP, 2011

⁵ This apparently contradiction of aprista sympathizers that are categorized as anti-apristas was tackle in focus groups and interviews. The explanation is the following: apristas disidents can still recognize themselves as sympathizers of the historic party, but they would not endorse any aprista candidate due to its ideological turn to the right.

Similarly, anti-fujimorismo is spread out across sympathizers with a number of Peruvian parties. Anti-fujimoristas are most prevalent among sympathizers with “nacionalismo” (PNP) and Peru Possible, both of which are higher than the general average (36%). As expected, only 4% of the 17% of sympathizers with Fuerza Popular (the fujimorista electoral vehicle in 2011) qualified as anti-fujimoristas⁶. This percentage was not statistically significant; it represents 10 respondents in a sample of 1570 individuals. Therefore, it can be concluded that “negative partisanship” spans across non-institutionalized political parties and is not concentrated in a particular positive identification.

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGES OF RESPONDENTS THAT SYMPATHIZE WITH POLITICAL
PARTIES AND PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS THAT WOULD NEVER
VOTE FOR A FUJIMORISTA BY EACH PARTISAN SYMPATHY

Parties	Sympathies	Anti-Fujimorismo
APRA	0.04	0.34
PPC	0.10	0.33
FP	0.17	0.04
PNP	0.26	0.54
SN	0.04	0.26
PP	0.06	0.48
FS	0.01	0.36
Others	0.09	0.64
None	0.30	0.40
DK	0.02	0.32
General		0.36

Source: IOP-PUCP, 2011

⁶ In a similar vein with the case of aprismo, his apparently contradiction of Fujimorista sympathizers that are categorized as anti-fujimorista is explained by a similar argument: since Keiko Fujimori assumed the control of the party, she executed a purge. Sanctioned fujimoristas –that still identify themselves as followers of Alberto Fujimori- respondent in personal interviews that they would never vote for a fujimorista candidate anymore (“until Alberto Fujimori returns to the presidency of the party”, Carlos Raffo, 18 July 2013).

1.5 Ideology

It has been largely demonstrated that (positive) party identification is an expression of social identification and ideology (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2004). On the other hand, negative party identification is rooted in instrumental reasoning, with weak connections to group identities but strong anchors in ideology (Medeiros and Noel 2013). Consequently, it is pertinent to analyze negative partisanship in terms of their ideological consistency, and if effectively, ideology is an efficient predictor of anti-identifiers.

Anti-fujimoristas and anti-apristas—respondents who hold negative partisan identifications—place themselves almost in the middle of the ideological continuum (where 0 equals extreme left and 10 extreme right), and to the left of the average ideological placement of all respondents in the sample. The average ideological self-placement of anti-apristas is 5.01, while the average self-placement of all respondents in the sample is 5.30.⁷ Anti-fujimoristas, who on average position themselves at 4.97 on the ideological continuum, are also located to the left of the average self-placement of all respondents in the sample (5.46). In both cases, the standard deviation of these self-placements is high: 2.60 and 2.44, respectively. Although these standard deviations reflect great ideological variation, mean tests provide statistically significant results (at the 99% of statistical confidence). Anti-identifiers are located to the left of the respective sample averages and are ideologically disperse, but in terms of their ideological self-positioning do not overlap with their non-anti-identifiers reference groups (after performing difference of means tests).

⁷ Difference of means are statistically significant.

TABLE 4

IDEOLOGICAL SELF-PLACEMENT (0-10 CONTINUUM) BY IDENTIFIER
GROUPS

Identifier	Mean	S.D.	99% Confidence Interval	
Anti aprista	5.01	2.61	4.80	5.22
Non-antiaprista	5.85	2.45	5.68	6.02
Total population	5.39	2.56		
Anti fujimorista	4.97	2.44	4.71	5.23
Non antifujimorista	5.75	2.45	5.60	5.90
Total population	5.46	2.47		

Source: IOP-PUCP national survey conducted on May 2011 (for anti-apristas); IOP-PUCP national survey conducted on June 2011 (for anti-fujimoristas)

Anti-apristas and anti-fujimoristas share, in average, almost the same centrist position in the ideological continuum. This fact is relevant since it evidences an ideological overlap between these two groups of identifiers. Consequently, a political discourse programmatically positioned around the convergence of anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo (which implies a position to the left of their respective positive identities), can capitalize the vacuum left by a over-population of the rightist realm of the continuum, considering that other political parties (PPC, Perú Posible) are also positioned to the right side, according to survey polls. Under these characteristics, Ollanta Humala is better equipped to be favored by the absence of representation of the anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo.

1.6 Ideology as a predictor of negative identifications

Opposition to particular political identifications is not the only defining element of negative identities. Theories of negative party identification maintain that ideology should be a significant determinant of “anti-identifiers” (Rose and Mishler 1998). This is reflected in the negative party identifications that exist in Peru. Survey data

suggests that negative party identification with APRA and Fujimorismo is significantly explained by individuals' ideological self-placement. I performed binary logit models to establish the effect of ideology on anti-aprimismo and anti-fujimorismo. I propose two operationalizations for ideology. The first operationalization (labeled as "right") is dichotomical on the 0-10 continuum. Respondents who place themselves at 7, 8, 9, or 10 on the continuum are categorized as right-wing voters. Individuals who position themselves on the remaining numbers on the continuum are categorized as non-right-wing voters. The second operationalization is the regular 11-point scale continuum (0 for extreme left, and 10 for extreme right). Both variants of ideological self-categorization are significant predictors of "anti-identities," in all cases at the 99% of confidence interval. Being a rightwing voter decreases the probability of being anti-aprista from 58% to 45% (Model 1) and the probability of being anti-fujimorista from 40% to 29% (Model 2). In addition, moving from 0 to 10 in the ideological continuum (shifting from the extreme left to the extreme right) decreases the probability of being anti-aprista from 71% to 39% (Model 3) and the probability of being anti-fujimorista from 51% to 25% (Model 4). Models include socio-demographic factors as control variables in order to prevent potential biases produced by income and education. The inclusion of age in the models controls for potential generational biases (APRA is a historic party, since Fujimorismo is relatively new), and the inclusion of sex as control permits to test the conventional wisdom that relates women's preferences with Fujimorismo (Blondet 2002). As expected, "anti-identifiers" are more likely to be from the left of the ideological continuum.

TABLE 5

IDEOLOGICAL SELF-POSITIONING AS A PREDICTOR FOR NEGATIVE

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	Model 1 antiapra	Model 2 antifuji	Model 3 antiapra	Model 4 antifuji
right	-0.501***	-0.567***		
	(0.129)	(0.142)		
ideology			-0.134***	-0.116***
			(0.023)	(0.025)
income	-0.007***	0.137*	-0.008***	0.117
	(0.001)	(0.079)	(0.001)	(0.079)
sex	-0.010	0.340***	-0.047	0.311**
	(0.115)	(0.124)	(0.116)	(0.125)
age	0.011***	0.317***	0.011***	0.307***
	(0.003)	(0.078)	(0.003)	(0.078)
education	-0.040	0.0616	-0.034	0.063
	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.039)
constant	0.300	-2.069***	0.887***	-1.497***
	(0.257)	(0.539)	(0.288)	(0.565)
R ²	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03
N	1284	1174	1284	1174

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Socio-economic factors have a more nuanced effect on negative party identification. For example, income is negatively associated with anti-aprismo (Model 1 and Model 3); being anti-aprista is less probable among respondents with higher incomes (the relationship is significant at the 99% confidence interval). However, the probability of being anti-fujimorismo increases in the higher classes, although the relationship is not statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. In terms of gender, being male significantly increases the probability of being anti-fujimorista (Model 2 and Model 4), and has no statistically significant effect on being anti-aprista (Model 1 and Model 3). Finally, the probability of being anti-fujimorista and anti-

aprista increases with age, a finding that coincides with existing theories regarding party identification that sustain that partisanship strengthens through time (Dalton and Weldon 2007). The relationship is statistically significant at the 99% of confidence interval in both cases. The specific role of these socio-demographic factors will be expanded upon in the final section of this paper.

Anti-fujimorismo is also associated with the personalistic appeals of Keiko Fujimori, the current leader of Fujimorismo. Respondents who position Keiko Fujimori as a right-wing presidential candidate tend to not reject any possibility of voting for a fujimorista candidate. Identifying Fujimori as a rightwing politician significantly decreases the probability of being anti-fujimorista, with a 99% of confidence interval (Model 5). In the same vein, respondents who laud Keiko Fujimori's democratic credentials tend not to be anti-fujimorista. Recognizing Fujimori's democratic credentials decreases the probability of being anti-fujimorista with a 99% of confidence interval (Model 6). Similarly, the probability of being anti-fujimorista decreases significantly if respondents believe Keiko Fujimori is rightwing and committed to democracy (attractive attributes for fujimorista followers).

TABLE 6

PERCEPTIONS REGARDING KEIKO FUJIMORI'S IDEOLOGICAL POSITION
AND DEMOCRATIC PREFERENCES AS PREDICTORS FOR NEGATIVE
PARTY IDENTIFICATION

	Model 5 Anti	Model 6 Anti
FujiRight	-0.448***	
	(0.123)	
FujiDemocrat		-1.391***
		(0.125)
Income	0.120	0.151**
	(0.078)	(0.077)
Sex	0.399***	0.262**
	(0.122)	(0.121)
Age	0.306***	0.346***
	(0.077)	(0.077)
Education	0.064	0.062
	(0.038)	(0.038)
constant	-1.914***	-1.688***
	(0.533)	(0.525)
R ²	0.02	0.09
N	1192	1346

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In summary, socio-demographic factors have a varied effect on negative party identification. Higher income is positively associated with anti-fujimorismo only in model 6. In terms of an individual's sex, being male increases the probability of being anti-fujimorista, with a 99% of confidence interval. In addition, age is positively associated with anti-fujimorismo and anti-aprismo, as demonstrated in previous logit models. Education has no statistical significant effect on negative party identification.

1.7 Anti-establishment appeals

Political parties and political institutions are discredited in the Andean countries. Post-collapse party systems suffer from what has been called a “crisis of democratic representation,” leveling a high degree of citizen disaffection from the state (Mainwaring 2006). As Rose and Mishler (1998) have demonstrated in post-communist cases, negative party identification ought to be at least as important as positive identification when political institutions appear untrustworthy.

In such circumstances, negative party identification may increase, capitalizing on the rejection of specific political parties and disaffection with the political establishment as a whole. The negative party identifications that result should be based on anti-political establishment appeals to the electorate. Anti-establishment politics seek to capitalize on two contrapositions: political elites against citizens, and anti-establishment leaders against political elites (Schedler 1996).

According to Kenney (1998), what defines an anti-establishment politician is her origin outside of the party system and her experience working within it. Thus, candidates who emerge from outside the party system with an anti-party discourse best fit the anti-establishment characterization (Carrera 2012). Anti-establishment leaders demonstrate that they can renew politics as usual and simultaneously maintain a discourse against the political class as a whole (Barr 2009). When party systems collapse and citizens perceive systematic state deficiencies, the potential for this type of political identity grows. In this sense, negative party identifications should be positively associated with “newness” and negatively associated with state satisfaction.

In order to operationalize the electorate’s preference for “new” political candidates, I categorize a multiple-answer question regarding potential political linkages into a dichotomous variable. The particular question pertains to the main

criteria needed to select a presidential candidate in a hypothetical election⁸. Five alternatives are provided as options: programmatic platforms, material benefits, personalistic appeals, candidate's party membership, and "being new in politics." Among anti-fujimoristas, 19% select the "new candidate" option (in comparison to 14% as a general average). Among anti-apristas, 14% select this option (in comparison to 12% as a general average).

I perform binomial logit models to identify the effect of "newness" on negative party identification. The preference for candidates who are completely new to politics is positively associated with "anti-identifiers" (both anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo), at a 99% of confidence interval. Preference for a presidential candidate who is new to politics increases the probability of being anti-aprista from 53 to 65% (Model 7), and the probability of being anti-fujimorista from 34 to 49% (Model 8). Consistent with previous models, income is negatively associated with anti-aprismo, being male is positively associated with anti-fujimorismo, and age is positively associated with both.

⁸ The wording of the question is the following: "In general, which of the following most influence you in order to give your vote to a presidential candidate?" Options assigned are: Personal qualities and the candidate's trajectory; political party of the candidate; electoral platform of the candidate or her party; the promise of a concrete benefit for you or your community; that she is a new politician".

TABLE 7
PREFERENCES FOR A “NEW” PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AS PREDICTOR
FOR NEGATIVE PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS

	Model 7 antiapra	Model 8 antifuji
new	0.476***	0.661***
	(0.152)	(0.147)
income	-0.006***	0.080
	(0.001)	(0.069)
sex	0.163	0.438***
	(0.097)	(0.107)
age	0.011***	0.216***
	(0.003)	(0.068)
education	-0.019	0.065*
	(0.023)	(0.034)
constant	-0.158	-1.976***
	(0.212)	(0.468)
R ²	0.02	0.02
N	1800	1570

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The preference for presidential candidates who are “new” to politics does not totally explain the probability of negative party identification. High levels of dissatisfaction with the state also characterize anti-establishment respondents. Accordingly, I create an index of state satisfaction based on 4 questions regarding levels of satisfaction with specific state services (education, health, security and road systems). I utilize factor analysis to create a variable that synthetizes the effect of these four variables in an attempt to infer a set of unobserved factors related to state satisfaction. Factor loadings regarding the four variables are all high and alike (0.70, 0.64, 0.65, 0.66, respectively), suggesting that all four are significant and have a similar degree of relevance.

As expected, state satisfaction is negatively associated with negative party identification. Being satisfied with the state's services is negatively associated with being anti-aprista, at the 95% of confidence interval (Model 9). Satisfaction with the state reduces the probability of a negative identification with APRA from 55% to 51% (a small substantive change). Similarly, being satisfied with state services is negatively associated with being anti-fujimorista (Model 10). Satisfaction with the state reduces the probability of a negative identification with Fujimorismo from 36% to 30%. Both “newness” and “anti-establishment” appeals form the structure of negative party identifications.

TABLE 8
STATE SATISFACTION AS A PREDICTOR OF NEGATIVE PARTY
IDENTIFICATION

	Model 9 antiapra	Model 10 antifuji
state satisf	-0.125**	-0.268***
	(0.057)	(0.075)
income	-0.006***	0.089
	(0.001)	(0.069)
sex	0.179*	0.427***
	(0.096)	(0.106)
age	0.011***	0.197***
	(0.003)	(0.067)
education	-0.029	0.043
	(0.023)	(0.034)
constant	-0.038	-1.752***
	(0.209)	(0.466)
R ²	0.02	0.02
N	1800	1570

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01

1.8 Negative partisan identification as a predictor of vote choice

If negative party identities help shape the electoral arena, they should also be effective predictors of vote choice (Medeiros and Noel 2013). Evidence from post-communist countries in the late 1990s demonstrated that negative party identifications played a relevant role in ordering vote choice (Rose and Mishler 1998). Similar to positive party identifications (discussed in Meléndez 2015), negative party identifications that are relevant in Peruvian politics (coherent ideological and anti-establishment structures) should represent significant determinants of vote choice.

Positive party identities are not fully developed in Peru (see Meléndez 2015). However, the nascent fujimorista party identity and surviving aprista party identity confront steady and profound opposition expressed through anti-aprista and anti-fujimorista party identifications. These “anti-identifiers” guide vote choice, including in elections where their positive counterparts are inactive. Statistical evidence, modeled by logistic regression analysis, confirms this hypothesis for both anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo.

Individuals associated with the anti-aprista identity (respondents qualified as “anti-apristas” according to my proposed measurement are assigned value of 1; all others are assigned value of 0) tended to vote for Ollanta Humala (vote tendency in favor of Alejandro Toledo is not statistically significant) and were unlikely to vote for Keiko Fujimori, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, or Luis Castañeda in the first round of the 2011 presidential elections (Table 9). This vote choice is expected. During the campaign, Humala was characterized as a left-wing and anti-establishment candidate, characteristics that related with anti-aprismo. His promise of a “Great Transformation” of the political establishment attracted voters who were disaffected from politics. On the other hand, Fujimori, Kuczynski, Toledo and Castañeda –all of

whom have previous public experience and identify to the right of the ideological center- were pro-establishment options that would have continued the orthodox economic policies of the previous decade. Interestingly, anti-aprismo opted against endorsing Fujimori in the run-off election because of her emphasis on the defense of the political establishment, despite Fujimorismo's past use of anti-establishment political appeals. Models (from 11 to 16) were controlled by regular socio-demographics (in order to control for income and education disparities, age effects and potential preferences framed by gender) that confirmed previous findings.

TABLE 9

NEGATIVE PARTY IDENTIFICATION (ANTI-APRISMO) AS A PREDICTOR OF 2011 VOTE CHOICE

	Model 11 OH1r	Model 12 KF1r	Model 13 PPK1r	Model 14 AT1r	Model 15 LC1r	Model 16 KF2r
anti apra	0.724***	-0.301**	-0.378***	0.00003	-0.699***	-0.639***
	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.148)	(0.160)	(0.106)
income	-0.002	-0.000008	0.006***	-0.001	-0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
sex	0.638***	-0.502***	-0.009	-0.185	-0.418***	-0.587***
	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.106)
age	-0.00006	-0.007*	-0.007	0.010**	0.007	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
education	-0.164***	-0.208***	0.281***	0.075**	0.051	0.041
	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.025)
constant	-0.449*	0.626**	-2.534***	-2.646***	-2.073***	0.509**
	(0.243)	(0.272)	(0.272)	(0.327)	(0.345)	(0.232)
N	1675	1675	1675	1675	1675	1530
R ²	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.006	0.02	0.03

Note: OH1r (vote choice in favor of Ollanta Humala for the first round), KF1r (vote choice in favor of Keiko Fujimori for the first round), PPK1r (vote choice in favor of Pedro Pablo Kuczinsky for the first round, AT1r (vote choice in favor of Alejandro Toledo for the first round, LC1r (vote choice in favor of Luis Castañeda for the first round), KF2r (vote choice in favor of Keiko Fujimori for the second round)

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Similarly, in the 2011 presidential elections anti-fujimoristas (respondents qualified as “anti-fujimoristas” according to my proposed measurement are assigned value of 1; all others are assigned value of 0) tended to vote for Ollanta Humala (in both the first and second round). They were also unlikely to endorse Keiko Fujimori (relationships with other candidates’ preferences are not statistically significant). In large degree, these vote preferences are due to anti-fujimorismo’s association with left-wing and anti-establishment appeals (Table 10). These preferences coincided with Humala’s leftwing and anti-establishment discourse during the campaign. Although Keiko Fujimori’s version of Fujimorismo (as opposed to her father’s) emphasized her father’s legacy of government efficiency, it also defended the economic status quo (“the market-oriented model originated in Alberto Fujimori’s Constitution”). The historical confrontation between Humala and Alberto Fujimori (Humala made his political debut in an attempted coup against Alberto Fujimori in 2000) solidified anti-fujimorismo’s support of Humala’s candidacy. Controlling for conventional socio-demographics, anti-fujimorismo is an efficient predictor of presidential vote choice for Ollanta Humala and Keiko Fujimori in both rounds of the 2011 presidential election.

TABLE 10

NEGATIVE PARTY IDENTIFICATION (ANTI-FUJIMORISMO) AS A PREDICTOR OF 2011 VOTE CHOICE

	Model 17 OH1r	Model 18 KF1r	Model 19 PPK1R	Model 20 AT1r	Model 21 LC1r	Model 22 OH2r
antifuji	1.328***	-2.035***	-0.171	0.202	-0.1477	2.324***
	(0.120)	(0.185)	(0.142)	(0.157)	(0.183)	(0.166)
income	0.4765***	-0.007	-0.448***	0.089	0.004	0.415***
	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.100)	(0.112)	(0.083)
sex	0.465***	-0.505***	0.035	-0.196	-0.124	0.396***
	(0.119)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.154)	(0.174)	(0.127)
age	0.139*	0.188**	-0.307***	0.175*	-0.027	-0.0145
	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.0817)
education	-0.055	-0.177***	0.186***	0.114**	0.0004	0.029
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.041)
constant	-3.088***	0.2741	-0.159	-3.167***	-2.022***	-2.122***
	(0.530)	(0.564)	(0.559)	(0.680)	(0.749)	(0.041)
	1472	1472	1472	1472	1472	1324
	0.12	0.14	0.1	0.009	0.001	0.18

Note: OH1r (vote choice in favor of Ollanta Humala for the first round), KF1r (vote choice in favor of Keiko Fujimori for the first round), PPK1r (vote choice in favor of Pedro Pablo Kuczinsky for the first round, AT1r (vote choice in favor of Alejandro Toledo for the first round, LC1r (vote choice in favor of Luis Castañeda for the first round), KF2r (vote choice in favor of Keiko Fujimori for the second round).

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.

1.9 Comparing anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo

Anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo appear to have a similar effect on individuals' vote choice, with different levels of statistical significance. Both groups of negative party identifiers tended to vote for Humala and tended not to vote for Fujimori (with 99% of statistical significance). Anti apristas tended not to vote for Kuczynski and not to vote for Castañeda, politicians that have been qualified as “close” to Alan García. The fact that both are centrist anti-establishment groups reinforces these findings and may suggest an overlap between them. However, evidence to measure anti-fujimorismo and anti-aprismo during the 2011 presidential elections was collected in two different surveys, making it impossible to define this overlap in greater detail.

TABLE 11

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN NEGATIVE PARTY IDENTITIES AND 2011 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE

Negative Party Identification	OH 1R	KF 1R	PPK	AT	LC	OH2R	KF2r
Anti-Aprismo	POS	NEG	NEG	POS	NEG		NEG
Anti-Fujimorismo	POS	NEG	NEG	POS	NEG	POS	

* Statistical significant relationships (99% of confidence interval) in bold letters

However, the replication of my proposed measurement of negative party identification by a commercial pollster –GfK– in 2014 allows us to precisely determine

the intersection between anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo, as well as the characteristics of correlation between these two “antis” ($r=0.41$). According to the survey results, 32.33% of respondents can be simultaneously categorized as anti-apristas and anti-fujimoristas. The ideological 1-7 scale GfK uses suggests that anti-apristas and anti-fujimoristas share extremely similar ideological views (they place themselves on the ideological scale at 4.08 and 4.03, respectively). Respondents who hold a “double” negative identification are self-placed (3.9) slightly to the left of those who identify with only one of the negative party identifications. (Unfortunately, GfK did not include questions to serve as proxies for testing the anti-establishment hypothesis). As expected, ideology is a significant determinant of “double” negative identification. A move toward the right is negatively associated with being a “double” negative identifier (99% of confidence interval; regression model not shown). Similarly, a shift from the extreme left to the extreme right on the ideological scale diminishes the probability of being both anti-aprista and anti-fujimorista from 41% to 22%, controlling by regular socio-demographics.

TABLE 12

IDEOLOGICAL SELF-POSITIONING OF NEGATIVE PARTY IDENTIFIERS

Negative Party identification	1-7 ideological scale mean	Standard deviation
Anti apristas	4.08	1.51
Anti fujimoristas	4.03	1.50
Both	3.92	1.49
General	4.20	1.49

Source: GfK

1.10 Negative partisan identification as predictor for presidential approval

If negative party identifications are useful predictors of vote choice, they may also affect other political outputs, such as presidential approval. There is a high probability that “anti apristas” and “anti fujimoristas”-who tended to vote for Humala in first and second round- have continued supporting him in office. Humala’s political party –Partido Nacionalista del Peru- is a new political organization that -since its foundation in 2006- has capitalized on the vacuum of leftwing political representation in Peru. Humala has tried to exploit both negative identities in his favor, so it is understandable that anti-apristas and anti-fujimoristas would support his administration. However, it is too early to create a “nationalist” political identity, although both “antis” may be the beginning.

As expected, negative party identifications (anti-aprismo, anti-fujimorismo, and the “double” negative identity) are positively associated with presidential approval for Humala.⁹ Results are statistically significant for anti fujimorismo (Model 24), as well as for the “double” negative identification (Model 25). Being anti fujimorista increases the probability of supporting President Humala from 17% to 25%. Similarly, being both anti-fujimorista and anti-aprista (a double negative identification) increases the probability of supporting President Humala from 18 %to 27%. Binary logit models where performed to test these relationships, controlling for income, sex, and age. Of the control variables, only sex was positively associated with presidential approval (Table 13).

⁹ Respondents qualified as “anti-fujimoristas” -according to my proposed measurement- are assigned value of 1; all others are assigned value of 0. In the same vein, respondents qualified as “anti-apristas” –according to my proposed measurement- are assigned value of 1; all others are assigned value of 0. Finally, respondents that qualified as “anti-fujimoristas” and as “anti-apristas” at the same time are assigned value of 1; all others are assigned value of 0.

TABLE 13

NEGATIVE PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS AS PREDICTORS OF PRESIDENT
HUMALA'S APPROVAL

	Model 23 OH Approv	Model 24 OH Approv	Model 25 OH Approv
antiapra	0.089		
	(0.141)		
antifuji		0.475***	
		(0.140)	
antis			0.448***
			(0.144)
income	-0.065	-0.054	-0.063
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
sex	0.336**	0.322**	0.326**
	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.141)
age	0.005	0.004	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
constant	-1.347***	-1.549***	-1.430***
	(0.312)	(0.319)	(0.313)
N	1227	1227	1227
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01

1.11 Socio-demographic determinants of negative party identifications

I performed four binary logit models to identify the determinants of anti-aprismo and six binary logit models to identify the determinants of ant-fujimorismo. In all of these models, regular socio-demographic variables were included as control variables. Consistency across models can help determine if these variables have an effect on the construction of negative partisan identification. In the case of anti-aprismo, income and

age are consistent and statistically significant determinants. An increase in income (operationalized as five distinct income levels) is negatively associated with anti-aprismo. All four models indicate significant associations at the 99% of confidence interval. Similarly, age is positively associated with anti-aprismo across all of the models in question. An increase in age augments the probability of being anti-fujimorista with 99% of statistical confidence. Education is not statistically associated with anti-aprismo. In the case of sex, evidence is not consistent across the models. Overall, anti-aprismo tends to be stronger in the lower classes and older age groups (Table 4.14).

TABLE 14
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DETERMINANTS OF ANTI-APRISMO

	Model 1	Model 3	Model 7	Model 9
Income	NEG	NEG	NEG	NEG
Sex	NEG	NEG	POS	POS
Age	POS	POS	POS	POS
Education	NEG	NEG	NEG	NEG

* Statistical significant relationships (99% of confidence interval) in bold letters

Sex and age are consistent determinants of anti-fujimorismo across various models. Associations for both socio-economic variables are statistically significant at the 99% of confidence. Being male and older increases the chances of being anti-fujimorista. Respondents with higher income and higher education levels also tend to be anti-fujimoristas, although this association is not statistical significant across all models. It is

important to note that, consistent with existing theories about partisanship, age is relevant for both negative identifications. Age is the best determinant for shaping party identities, regardless of whether they are positive or negative; older voters are more likely to have party identities and negative party identities. Finally, class matters more for anti-apristas (antiaprisimo tends to be stronger in lower classes; antifujimorismo tends to be stronger in higher classes but models are not consistent), while gender dominates for anti-fujimoristas (anti-fujimorismo tends to be stronger among men).

TABLE 15
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DETERMINANTS OF ANTI-FUJIMORISMO

	Model 2	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 8	Model 10
Income	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS
Sex	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS
Age	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS
Education	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS	POS

* Statistical significant relationships (99% and 95% of confidence interval) in bold letters

Negative party identifications are related to certain socio-demographic groups (anti aprismo with lower classes, and anti-fujimorismo with males). However, they are mainly structured by political variables like ideology and anti-establishment appeals. A combination of both socio-demographic and political variables leads to a better understanding of these negative partisan identifications.

1.12 Conclusions

Negative party identification is an intense and lasting opposition to a specific partisan identity that is maintained across different levels of government. In the Peruvian

case, these anti identities are not mere counterweights to “positive” identifications. On the contrary, both anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo maintain an autonomous structure based on leftist ideological leanings and anti-establishment appeals. Moreover, anti-aprismo tends to be stronger in the lower classes, while anti-fujimorismo is more prevalent in males. In both cases, as with any type of party identification, age serves to strengthen these negative party identifications.

Voters who choose not to engage in “positive” partisanship do not necessarily opt out of the system. In some cases, negative identifications represent a viable political alternative. In contexts of post-party system collapse where political parties are fluid and partisan loyalties volatile, negative partisanship organizes politics. In the Peruvian case, positive surviving partisanship (aprismo), and emerging partisanship (fujimorismo) are accompanied by anti-aprismo and anti-fujimorismo, respectively. As expected, these negative partisanships are efficient predictors of vote choice and presidential approval (in particular the case of anti-fujimorismo). The absence of an institutionalized party system does not necessarily mean the absence of political criteria to guide voters’ decisions at the polls. While these negative partisan identities are not represented organically, they exist at the individual level.

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