

Armed Forces in Developing Countries: Building States, beyond Democracy and Security.

1. Introduction.

1.1. Description of the problem.

The night of the December 21, 1994, the Brazilian federal senate authorized five loans for a total of US\$1395 million for the Amazon Surveillance System (acronym SIVAM, Laurençao 2003, 117). That was only part of many changes that Brazil experienced in the period 1990-2010 in order to expand and increase the control over the "Amazonia Legal", the Brazilian part of the Amazon forest. In a country with high levels of inequality, and priorities more pressing and appealing to the public like education, health, pensions, urban security, poverty and unemployment alleviation, seems against political logic. Defense expenditure can usually be delayed for future times, at least in countries lacking of clear threat, and certainly in cases that can hardly be called developed. That, to us is the puzzle this project aims to answer.

To provide some context for Latin America, a region where our puzzle appears let's start Mares (2001, 37) who refutes the idea that violence even in the form of interstate wars is rare among Latin American countries: "*In terms of total international wars since 1986 (the start date for quantitative studies of war) Latin America is not exceptionally peaceful*", even beyond the XIX century: "*Latin America's ranking is not entirely different when we just examine the twentieth century, when virtually all of African, Asian and Middle Eastern wars occurred*" (Mares, 2001, 37). Moreover "*If we turn our attention to interstate disputes in which official military violence is threatened or used without producing war, Latin America appears even more violent*" (Mares 2001, 38).

Other authors provide a similarly complex image: Buzan & Wæver (2003, 320-337) describe the context of South America at the three levels: domestic, regional and subregional, and interregional and global. At the domestic level they point the preeminence of three interlinked phenomena: democratization as transition from authoritarianism or improvement of on democratic quality, reduction of the power of the military and defense and neoliberal reforms and internationalization of economies. They add the indigenous population and marginalization as issues that could shape the security environment (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 320-322).

At regional level and subcomplexes, three issues are salient. The first is the Argentinean and Brazilian rapprochement which deactivated the major rivalry in the region. The second is the emergence of Mercosur as a more effective integration process than

previous. The third is the border disputes resolution, especially in Argentina-Chile and Ecuador-Peru cases (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 322-323).

Finally at Interregional and global level they mention three main developments, all transformational *vis-à-vis* the relation with the U.S. The first is the role of Latin America as producer and place of transit for drugs. The second is the economic liberalization. And the third was regional integration which was both a form of integration with the form and a mean to preserve and spur regional cohesion, specially facing the threat of marginalization (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, 333-337).

An intervenient variable in those processes is the emphasis of the Washington consensus. On the one side, created established the idea of fiscal responsibility and export oriented economies, which allowed Latin America to replace the aging Import Substitution Industrialization. On the other, it created an emphasis for at least a decade of reduction in public spending, and public sector in general: *“For its economies to grow, the region will probably have to strengthen its political institutions, many of which currently face considerable challenges in delivering effective governance, tackling underdeveloped commercial legislation, employment law and fiscal credibility. Without action, these issues are likely to continue to have a damaging effect on levels of foreign direct investment, limiting the region’s economic potential”* (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre [DCDC] 2014, 112-113). But also, the emphasis on state downsizing in the nineties should be considered as factor explain the outcomes of defense reforms.

In that context, Defense systems are very important phenomena in politics and political science as they determine the location of a country in terms of war and peace. Defense systems involve not only armed forces, but also defense ministries, defense policies and associated budgets, personnel, installations and equipment. Reforms are understood as a major change in the goals or means in the defense system that modify the training, doctrine, equipment and organization in the forces. Such phenomena usually answer to two main driving forces present in the literature:

- The increase (or decrease) of a threat, that is, a confrontational logic to defeat or deter an adversary or enemy from attaining the political or economical goals of a country or armed group, via the increase in resources allocated to the defense system.
- An impulse by civilian authorities for armed forces more responsible to democratic principles. This is an effort to attain: an adjustment to the norms that society now consider common and mandatory for the country or political entity like the inclusion

of previously discriminated groups or human rights in the processes of the armed forces; or a more efficient use of the public resources via the reduction of budget or the inclusion of efficiency criteria like cost-effectiveness or a reorientation to tackle more the threats perceived by the society than those perceived by the military.

However, many reforms do not conform to this pattern. *Why are countries like Brazil or Bolivia increasing their number of troops and deploying them along the territory, spending money on an area not priority to the public? Why this occurs in the absence a military threat? Why this occurs in countries not experiencing an autocratic involution, an argument that can be built for Venezuela but no for Brazil or Colombia for the 1990-2010 period?* The objective of this project is to explain how and why those reforms attempt to expand State power in areas where its control has not yet consolidated. This is a dimension neglected by the literature on military reforms.

If we look at developed countries, many of them have been eliminating compulsory military service (for instance Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). This feature is just a notorious part of several examples of reforms aimed to create a more professional and advanced armed force with a greater response capability. Other cases close to, or recently included in, the category of developed countries present similar traits to those above mentioned, such as South Korea or Chile. These would all be cases of defense reforms aimed at a better sense of accountability, that is to say, fulfilling the objectives of their democratically elected leaders through both and emphasis in human rights and an increase in efficiency, usually a demand to do the same with less resources. The literature in CMR is consistent with that pattern.

However, other developing countries are not moving in the same direction. They are increasing the number of military personnel in the *absence of a clear threat*¹. Usually, such an increase would be an answer to a threat of another country, an alliance between countries, or an autocratic involution. A need of more troops would follow in order to topple, balance or dissuade a foreign or guerrilla advance, or to repress dissidents within territory. Nevertheless, no such traits are present in cases like Brazil or Bolivia. What new aspect is there at play here? Why spend millions or even billions of dollars in reforms that do not cope *with a clear existential threat to the survival of the nation, the territory or any major value?* While public spending is put under the scope of the efficiency, and social

¹ Threat would be used to encompass external threat from another countries as well as internal threat by a guerrilla, armed opposition or any armed resistance inside of the country. Although very different phenomena themselves they elicit a similar response from the state: an armed campaign to defeat and eventually suppress the threat.

issues are a clear priority to the public (specially the electorate), then why use resource that could be spent in pressing issues like education, health, pensions, welfare devoted to an expansion of the defense apparatus in absence of any evident pressure to do so? In those case not only efficiency but, but a stable or even improving level of democracy alone would predict a reduction in the size of the military apparatus or at best a preservation of the budget and numbers of personnel, not an increase. The explanations for those changes cannot be found within the bounds of the traditional literature for this area.

1.2. Gaps in current literature.

Reductions in military personnel are in line with the works in the Civil-Military Relations literature, or those on Security Sector Reform (which is a British variation of the latter with and applied emphasis). At least in the last two decades, the conventional wisdom has been to reduce military personnel. Nevertheless, some countries do not conform to this pattern. Instead of decreasing their personnel, they have been increasing the number of troops, deploying forces far from the capital, and acquiring equipment that surpasses that of a mere replacement in weaponry. Although some authors have noted the process, they have not developed an explanation for a whole phenomenon: “(...) *national security policy can either focus inward, seeking to reduce the vulnerabilities of the state itself, or outward, seeking to reduce external threat by addressing its sources*” (Buzan, 1991, 112). However, we are not looking at cases of failed states recruiting personnel to fight a bloody war (the kind of armed conflict that stirred the debate about the so called “New Wars” by Mary Kaldor (1999, 2003). Brazil, lacking in any guerrilla, is hardly a failed state; however, just like Colombia, it has been increasing the number of its military personnel. On the same contingent, Chile is experiencing a consistent reduction in the number of military personnel of the 1990-2010 period. Beyond the continent, South Korea, a country that is facing a clear military threat from North Korea is planning to reduce the number of personnel by more than a hundred of thousand effectives.

Brazil and some other developing states like Bolivia, are essentially trying to develop an overlooked dimension in military reforms: infrastructural power (“*the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and implement its actions across its territories*” Mann, 2008, 355). Such dimension is different from the relation between citizens and their government, that is to say, the quality of the democracy. The dimension of interest of this research has to do with the penetration of state presence itself: “*States beginning with little despotic power and infrastructural power will seek to develop the former capacities first*”

(Mann, 1991, 20). The following phase, that is, the attempts to increase infrastructural is often ignored in countries with extreme values, such as highly industrialized nations or fragile states. In developed countries, it often proves unnecessary, since state infrastructure is at a very high level. Even in a situation of damaged state capacity, civilian agencies could take care of arising circumstances. Contemporary examples are the role of FEMA in the USA or the extinct Colonial Office in the UK, but even those state had to resort to armed forces in the past to build power, like the cavalry in the march to the west or the “thin red line” in colonial Britain. In the countries where state presence is too low, like Somalia or Ethiopia, the number of armed forces serves to maintain ruling factions in power, so nothing even close to a “reform” in structure could take place: *“Although numbers alone do not constitute a security strategy, successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants.”* (Quinlivan, 2003, 28)

But humans, being self-aware entities do not just contemplate problems: they react to them. Policzer (pp. 37-38) sustains that in the face of fragmented sovereignty several possible answers arise. He offers a typology of four possible responses: ultra-sovereigntist, globalist, cold realist and humanitarian realist. Policzer’s suggestions to an inefficient state power are as follow: to buttress or replace failing institutions with international ones (“globalist” p. 37); to simply ignore the problem (“cold realist” p. 38); or to search an intermediate way trough NGO’s and international assistance (“humanitarian realist” p. 38). The “ultra-sovereigntist response” suggests the answer to insufficient state power is to create more (p. 37). Policzer’s ultra-sovereigntist approach is of particular interest to this research, as supports the hypothesis on how a state lacking in presence might seek to increase power through security means.

Mann works on an important distinction. He establishes two dimensions of organizational reach: authoritative v/s diffused; and extensive versus intensive (Mann, 1993, 7-9). Our project aims to address how the states try to *transform* intensive authoritative power (like a military formation) into diffused authoritative power (like military domination of a territory) or even extensive diffused power (like a functional commercial system). We aim at assess the state attempts to turn one of the crystallized type Mann conceive mutate into other of those types. Therefore although we will be counting intensive power, we will try to observe how such power is turned into extensive one.

1.3. Layout of the project.

This project, does not deny the validity of the preexisting literature; it tries to assert the existence of an additional dimension as cause of defense reforms. In other words, it does not attempt to explain reforms entirely. A military reform could be the outcome of many variables; therefore we will present alternative hypotheses. Rather than explain reforms as a whole, this research will address one of their dimensions, in an attempt to establish an exclusive mechanism of a smaller phenomenon (the infrastructural dimension) instead of a non-exclusive cause of a larger one (the complete reform). This research will not measure the effectiveness of the reform, which in itself depends on several other factors and is beyond the scope of this project.

To answer the research question we will attempt to measure the increase of extensive or intensive forms of power. Intensive power would mean a concentration of forces previous or during warfare against an enemy (internal or external); While extensive power would mean the dispersion of forces through territory to face tasks different from warfare. The distinction is similar to the difference between war making and state making presented by Tilly (1985, 181). Therefore the following Hypotheses will be presented:

H1: *“Low infrastructural power causes defense reforms to address in reforms processes the extensive power projection dimension”*.

The alternative hypothesis according to CMR literature would be:

A1.1: *“Low accountability causes defense reforms to address in reforms processes the extensive power projection dimension”*.

While the alternative hypothesis according to International Security literature would be:

A1.2: *“Military threats causes defense reforms to address the extensive power projection dimension”*.

A secondary hypothesis, aimed at explore if infrastructure creation dimension and accountability creation are compatible or exclusive aspects of a reform:

H2: *“A defense reform can address both, accountability dimension and extensive power projection”*.

And the null hypothesis for that:

A2.1: *“A defense reform can aim at creating either accountability dimension or extensive power projection dimension, but not both”*.

Therefore there are three kinds of variables:

- Dependent: dimension of the reform, specifically, extensive power creation.

- Independents: infrastructural power level, and alternatively, accountability level, and threat level.
- Interventient: Washington consensus. Active only in the 90's period.

Evidence Collection:

In order to substantiate these claims, five main sources of evidence will be provided:

- i. Data of military systems and deployment;
- ii. Public policy documents, official documents and existent literature;
- iii. Interviews with key informants.
- iv. Data on population, population density.
- v. Macroeconomic data.

The first three would cover the dependent variable. The first one will help clarify levels in the discussion and avoid a simply impressionistic assessment of the cases as developed, strong, weak, and underdeveloped. The type of equipment and the deployment of armed forces trough the territory would reveal in the defense forces are being concentrated for intensive power (warfare) o extensive power (deployment along the territory).

The second source should reveal the underlying purposes of reforms, as stated by official statements, polices, strategies or white papers. This would reveal declared which direction the military reform has as intended goal, and which kind of forces are employing.

The third should reveal considerations about interpretations of data, avoiding oversimplification or biases contained in the data, and eventually allowing corrections or controls.

The fourth variable would address the independent variable of infrastructural power via the absence or presence of population.

The fifth source would be used to substantiate the claim that the "Washington consensus" created a clear but brief emphasis in disinvestment on the state during the nineties.

1.4. Operations definitions.

In order to clarify the discussion we will provide some operational definitions.

Case: a case to us, as we stated before will not be a country but a defense reform.

Reform: a reform to us will be a "Major reassignment of means and objectives in the armed forces, aimed at permanently transforming their capabilities to fulfill some goals or to achieve some capabilities previously absent". It would be important to establish a difference between a reform and an operation.

Operation: An operation will be a “set of military activities involving personnel and means outside military facilities to achieve a specific goal”.

In that sense, warfare involves operations, while reforms involve transformations. Operations and reforms can one be the cause of the other, or they can occur simultaneously, but they are not the same. For instance the counterterrorism emphasis that the United States has imprinted in their armed forces could be considered a reform, while the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are both operations by themselves. This is to establish a difference between specific deployment and the reforms underlying them, or to differentiate short term operations (like Mexico) from long term reforms (like Brazil).

Accountability: Accountability, in our specific context will mean the degree of democratic control that exists in a specific domain. Therefore, Accountability in defense will be the degree of transparency and the ability of the government to clearly set the goals of the armed forces. We are not therefore assuming the causal relations between stateness and democracy, not even exploring the “*critical for social rights and the rule of law*” (Møller & Skaaning, 2011, 16).

Intensive Power: it means a special concentration of power: troops, strikers, protestors in relatively small space like a rally, or a military formation.

Extensive power: it means the dispersion of power, the manifestation of power through space: markets and empires are examples of extensive power. People sparsely allocated are capable of operative through extensive power, like the recognition of currency from other countries or the execution of orders coming from a distant capital.

Proxies: there are three proxies for the dependent variable (extensive power projection of the reform); an increase of military personnel in absence of threat; an increase in equipment with capabilities other than warfare; deployment of armed forces through the territory and away from the centers of political power.

The first proxy responds to the idea that state power is precarious, and requires a form of presence less violent than war, but more capable than police forces, such as the deployment of numbers soldiers on the ground, that is, the strength of the armed forces in numbers and how such numbers increase or decrease.

The second proxy is military equipment. Military equipment can serve manifold roles, some in combat, some in operations different from warfare, and some to both kinds of operations. Jet fighters, bombers, tanks, submarines, missiles, guns and bombs are almost exclusively warfare-related equipment; while equipment like multipurpose vessels, transport helicopters, military trucks and transport aircrafts can perform war duties, but can

also be used in disaster relief operations, deployment of humanitarian assistance, Peace Keeping Operations, evacuations, and many others functions. This equipment with non-lethal capabilities is the type of physical capital we would expect to find in order to create infrastructural power, as it is able to transport military personnel, provide public services, control illegal activities through visual surveillance, and reach remote regions. We used the term non-lethal capabilities over multirole weapons systems, since multirole reminisces mainly modern aircraft capable of fulfilling combat, bomber and other functions inside conventional warfare, and we are looking at capabilities outside the realm of conventional warfare.

An increase in equipment with non-lethal capabilities would reflect an increase in the infrastructural capacity of the state. Figures about military personnel are available at source like Military Balance, but would require a classification and clarification of which specific equipment constitutes one with non-lethal capabilities. Therefore some typological work will be developed. It would also be assumed that changes in military technology would be non-significant in terms of number of equipment, therefore the effect of new equipment would not be treated as having a causal effect on the increase or decrease of overall figures.

The third proxy is deployment. Military forces require installations to operate: airfields, bases, ports and other facilities are the places where equipment and personnel are gathered, stored, maintained and upgraded and from where military operations begin in terms of space. The location of those facilities is revealing of the intended purposes of the forces. Regiments near the capital are to protect the city from attacks, coups or to bring forces in in case of riots. Bases near the border reveal a perception of threat from the neighboring countries (like the Maginot line in France bordering Germany). If the installations are located in scarcely populated territories, then the forces might be there for two purposes: to take advantage of inhabited space for military exercises or to reassert the presence of the state where there is not much civil service to do so. Information about those installations is partially available in national sources.

Time frame: The 1990-2010 period is a time frame we consider relevant and useful for several reasons. First a period where the Cold War variables lose relevance, and therefore have a low chance of intervening. Second, is a period of democratization in the developing world, and therefore an era where civilian considerations would not be neglected by a military dictatorship. In other words the expansion of armed forces could respond to an increased focus on security were the higher authorities from the armed

forces. Since our hypothesis is that such changes respond to a different cause is useful to be able to eliminate that variable selecting a period of high prevalence of democratic institutions. We also look beyond the specific immediate responses to the end of the Cold War or the attacks of September 11th 2001, by taking a period of two decades, and where specific influence or “eagerness” related to those events would have been faded.

1.5. Problem of colinearity among explanations

The deployment of forces over the territory possesses, however, several subtleties that we must consider. It is relatively easy to separate reforms that bring troops near the source of political power, from those that move them near a perceived enemy. Nevertheless it is complicated to separate a deployment in a territory that is both, inhabited and disputed: Is the deployment an attempt to create infrastructural power, to balance a threat, or both? In order to address the subject, we can take two variables to define areas. The first variable is how secure the territory is from threats. The other variable is its location relative to the centers of political power. From this, we can establish four categories: a threatened area near the center of political power is a core insecure area. A threatened area far from the center of political power is a peripheral insecure area. A non-threatened area near a center of political power is a secure area. Finally a non-threatened area far from a center of political power is an area with vacuum of power (see table 1.1). This classification is not intended to classify countries, but areas inside countries, although the underlying logic is very similar to the work of Giraudy & Luna (2014), in the sense that there are two dimensions to consider: the ability of the government to project power, and the degree of threat from a challenger. Both variables are not different and can run independently.

Table 1.1. Areas in relation to the proximity of political power and threat for countries with intermediate infrastructural power

		Security of the territory in terms of armed rivalry	
		Threatened	Non Threatened
Location in relation to the centers of political power	Near	Core insecure areas	Secure areas
	Far	Peripheral Insecure areas	Areas with a vacuum of power

Source: Own elaboration

It is necessary to bear in mind the former classification was built to consider states with an intermediate infrastructural power. In countries with a very low infrastructural power, areas near the capital not threatened by armed threat might not be secure: an internal menace puts the entire State in peril, as we can observe in Somalia. On the other hand, threatened areas far from the political power might not be insecure in a developed country: the city of Ceuta might be under Moroccan threat, but the infrastructural power of Spain, let alone NATO and the European Union, leave that city as a very secure location. We could replace the categories with some applicable to any kind of state (table 1.2).

Table 1.2. Areas in relation to the proximity of political power and threat for any country

		Security of the territory in terms of armed rivalry	
		Threatened	Non Threatened
Location in relation the centers of political power	Near	Core contested areas	Core non contested areas
	Far	Peripheral contested areas	Areas with a vacuum of power

Source: Own elaboration

If we compare the two tables the second one uses words than are terminologically more precise albeit at the cost of a larger description. The first table instead, resorts to shorter terms, less ambiguous but more appropriate if we restrict the scope to States with infrastructural power at a medium level. The second table is truth at an analytical level, the first only at a synthetic level. But since our focus is already restricted to countries in intermediate level of infrastructural power, we will stick to the terminology from table 1.1.

1.6. Case selection:

There are two countries selected as cases for study: Brazil and Chile. The main criterion is cases experiencing transformation in their armed forces, and that such transformation would answer respond to different levels of infrastructural power. Mexico for example is simply deploying armed forces, but we could not classify the case as a reform, as our units of observation in the dependent variable are not countries but reforms. The second criterion is to control the variable of democracy, selecting cases where the features of a possible authoritarianism are not present (such as Venezuela). A third criterion was

parsimony. Colombia, although present many traits of being developing infrastructural power, is also facing an internal threat from guerrilla groups, therefore causality would be hard to isolate. We also would include as a shadow case South Korea and México, to present evidence of countries that conform to a more conventional explanation, and how such cases are distinctly different from reforms in Latin America.

The obvious critique to this selection is that we are selecting on the dependant variable. The point is true, but following Goertz & Mahoney 2012, case selection should answer to the research objectives. And we are interested in the mechanisms of the reform. Since we are trying to explain the variations in dependent and independent variables, we will do that through the causal logic involved. To account for variations we will use shadow cases when and if they are relevant. What is of most interest to us is to find similar processes inside the cases to account for a regular path that links the independent variable with the dependant variable.

1.7. Dimensionality.

A key feature of the project is the dimensionality of Extensive power creation. Since we are not talking about mutually exclusive types of reforms, but one of their dimensions, it is essential to measure said dimensions independently from each other. The dimensions existent in the literature are Threat and Defense Accountability, and the dimension we add, is Infrastructural Power Building. The “Threat” dimension has an emphasis on threatened territory, that is, territory relevant in terms of a rivaling relationship with foreign or inner violent actors. The Defence Accountability is the alignment of organization, structure, personnel, material and operations to a clearer democratic mandate. Extensive power projection is the use of the Defense System to create or increase state capacity in location where the State has low or no presence.

Many of the proxies for one dimension are equal to the proxies for another dimension. A “threat” dimension would involve a buildup of military capabilities, which has 5 features:

1. increase in lethal capability weapons systems,
2. increase in non-lethal capability systems,
3. a deployment to core insecure areas,
4. a deployment to peripheral insecure areas,
5. eventually, an increase in military personnel.

The second, third and fifth condition are also present (at least partially) in an “Infrastructural Construction” dimension (table 1.3).

Table 1.3 Dimensions of military reforms and their proxies

		External factor triggering dimension inside the reform		
		Low infrastructural power	High Threat	Low defense accountability
Military personnel		Increases	Varies	Decreases
Deployment of forces	Core insecure areas	No	Yes	No
	Peripheral Insecure areas	Yes	Yes	No
	Areas with a vacuum of power	Yes	No	No
	Secure areas	No	No	Yes
Increase in Military equipment	Lethal	No	Yes	No
	Non-lethal	Yes	Yes	No

Source: Own elaboration

If we want to identify a reform that has an “Infrastructural Construction” dimension we need to look at the absence of lethal capabilities as evidence of that kind of reform. One can also look at the kind of deployment that each dimension creates. Although both kinds of dimension (Infrastructural Construction and Threat) deploy troops in distant regions, they have a different, partially overlapping focus. The “Infrastructural Construction” dimension deploys forces in terms of distance with political power (see table 1). That creates only partial overlapping in areas that are both threatened and far from political power. But unless that is the case, the deployment is a key differentiating feature of the dimensions of the reform (table 1.4).

Table 1.4. Areas in relation to the proximity of political power and threat for countries with intermediate infrastructural power and the dimensions of military reforms associated with them

		Security of the territory in terms of rivalry	
		Threatened	Non Threatened
Location in relation the centers of political power	Near	<p>threat</p> <p>Core Insecure areas</p>	<p>Low defense</p> <p>Secure areas</p>
	Far	<p>Peripheral Insecure areas</p> <p>Low infrastructural power</p>	<p>Areas with a vacuum of power</p>

Source: Own elaboration

1.8. Methodology.

To present the main argument of the project a comparative study will be conducted. Evidence congruent with the hypotheses will be presented, therefore providing the means to compare the causal logic of turning a deficiency in infrastructural power into a dimension in a reform. As was stated in the item of case selection, this study will endeavor to provide its conclusions as based off the detailed comparison between the cases of Chile and Brazil.

Chile is a control case consistent with the lines of CMR conventional explanations. The control over military branches has indeed increased during the 1990-2010 period. Together with that the military personnel has experienced a decrease since 1990-2010 from 100.000 to near 60.000 effectives, and reduction of military expenditure from 4.3% to 3.2% of the GDP. Brazil, in a different vein, created during the same period several institutions to face a penetrated border: the SIVAM, the SIPAM and the *Programa Calha Norte*, together with the creation of a civilian Ministry of Defense and a Defense Policy. Both countries present important developments in terms of military transformations. The countries will also experience of the intervenient variable, and to defend our hypothesis we will expect a decline in its influence after the nineties decade.


Though it is arguable that a case like Mexico might provide evidence of the presence of the independent variable, and an absence of the dependent variable, Mexico

will remain as a shadow case. The interest of this study is in reforms, and Mexico lacks coherent reforms in this area, thus providing no relevant evidence.

To measure the respective variables, we will start with the independent variable:


1. Low accountability: Low accountability can be established based on the information available on the defense policy papers or defense white books, or lack thereof. Low accountability can also be established on the other facts: the number of defense ministers who are not former military, the information available on the institutional web pages, the existence of joint commanders and services.
2. Perception of Threats: The perception of threats can be observed from the Uppsala conflict data base. Although it is a less objective source, it picks up on more subtle levels of conflict than the other methodologies (1,000 battle related casualties). The presence of previous conflicts is also an indicative of previous and possible protracted quarrels.
3. Infrastructural Power level: low infrastructural power can be measured indirectly through various means. One is the population density when it reaches levels that go beyond a minimal threshold. A definition for that threshold could be ranges below 1/10 of the population in the regions in the higher range (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). A second indicator is the interregional differences approach found in the stateness literature.

Figure 1.1. South America: Population Density, By Major Administrative Divisions, 2000 census round.



Source:DEPUALC 2004 data base [online], CELADE/ECLAC [October 4, 2013]. Available at <<http://www.eclac.cl/celade/depualc/>>

Figure 1.2. Middleamerica: Population Density, by major administrative divisions, 2000.




Source: DEPUALC 2004 data base [online], CELADE/ECLAC [October 4, 2013]. Available at <<http://www.eclac.cl/celade/depualc/>>

The Dependant variable can be obtained through the proxies of extensive power already mentioned. That is the number of soldiers, the number and type of equipment and the deployment of forces trough territory, the policy documents and the interviews. The number of soldier per region or military command can reveal the emphasis the country is putting on one region versus another. However, to differentiate between the extensive power projection and the threat hypothesis we would need to observe the type of equipment that is deployed with the force: conventional combat equipment like tanks, combat jet and frigates would be used to balance or counter the buildup of an enemy force and therefore sustain the threat hypothesis. The deployment of equipment capable of non combat roles like utility helicopters, trucks, multipurpose amphibious vessels instead would reveal an intention to assert state presence and therefore sustain the extensive power hypothesis.

The policy documents would reveal an explicit intention of orienting a reform in determined directions. That of course that the declarations would reveal a perfect image of the intended transformations, but should at least be coherent with the forces involved in the reform. Finally interviews could provide an insight of internal negotiations of concessions not included in documents.

The intervenient variable would be observed through macroeconomic data: emphasis in major economic indicators like inflation, growth and foreign direct investment, should provide evidence of an emphasis on the idea of the Washington consensus in the nineties. The general layout of the process would be something like figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3 Independent variable causing emphasis in military reforms, and proxies revealing attempts in those reforms to create transformations.



Source: Own elaboration

2. Theoretical discussion.

There is abundant literature related to the topic of military reforms. Nevertheless, this paper will emphasize only the frameworks that support the hypotheses or are congruent with the cases we have selected.

2.1. Civil-Military Relations

The main focus in military reform comes from the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) literature. In some ways CMR is a development of the democratization literature (see Przeworski, Adam; et al., 2000; and the articles in *Journal for Democracy*). In the same way that the conditions for a democracy are looked for in democratization literature, the conditions for civil control are looked for in the CMR literature. The efforts of CMR are aimed at reforming armed forces to avoid military coups, and to make them more accountable with the democratic will.

This literature in the field begins with the works of Huntington (1956 and 1957) and Janowitz (1960). The former one installed the idea of “military professionalism”, that is, given certain conditions armed forces could develop their activities with autonomy: that is without government interference, but also without the need to define defense policies. The latter aimed instead to involve the higher civilian authorities, attempting to provide certain basic criteria to guide the military, in what he called “civilian leadership in defense”. While the first believed in a functional separation, the second estimated it impossible for a democratic leadership to avoid its involvement in order to achieve an accountable military apparatus. This established a crucial question in the literature: does a “neutral” niche exist for the military?

Further works like the ones of Pion-Berlin (1992) discovered that the concept of professionalism didn't make the military less prone to military coups, but rather more capable of them. When organized through technical knowledge, an ethos of their own, an *sprit de corps*, and a permanent structure, armed forces were no longer constrained to employ violence only at certain times; these new features allowed them to replace entire components of the state apparatus: *“Latin America offers no confirmation of Huntington’s assertion that there is an automatic identity between corporate autonomy and political subordination. To the contrary, corporate autonomy and submission to civilian control may be inversely related to one another”* (Pion-Berlin 1992, 85). Such ideas ended, at least in Latin America, with what O’Donnell termed Bureaucratic Authoritarianism states: a regime where the military not only overthrew the government in functions, but was also able to

replace it, at least in the leadership selection process, and usually other areas deemed in need of a reform.

Feaver tried instead to explain CMR as a result of incentives for every player. According to his model the civil government and the military face a principal-agent problem. Therefore, the civil government can choose to monitor or not if the military complies with the democratic mandate, depending on the costs and benefits of monitoring and sanctioning such a process. Conversely, the military can either comply or shirk the civil mandate according to the intrusiveness of the inspection and the cost of the sanctions. In the model, the civil government chooses whether monitor the military's compliance with the political directions or not, depending on its own incentives structure. Then, the military has two choices: to work (W) according to the civilian instructions or to shirk (S) "*between doing what the civil government wants exactly or violating civilian orders*" (Feaver, 1995, 409). In the case where the military decides to shirk, two situations can occur: to be caught or to not be caught. If the civil government catches the military shirking, it has the choice to punish or not punish the non-compliance. Then we have the abbreviations from Feaver (1998, 411):

W: The civilian payoff of having the military working as he wants.

S: The civilian payoff of having military shirking.

C_1 : Civilian costs of monitoring.

S_1 : The civilian payoff of having military shirking and punished.

S_2 : The civilian payoff of having military shirking and not punished.

p: Costs to military of punishment (makes shirking less valuable to the military).

w_1 : The payoff of the military work while not being monitored.

w_2 : The payoff of the military shirking being monitored.

s_1 : The military payoff of shirking without being monitored.

s_1 : The military payoff of shirking being monitored.


a: The probability of detecting shirking if no monitoring.

b: The probability of detecting shirking with intrusive monitoring.

g: the probability of punishing shirking.

The decisional game tree is depicted in figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Decisional tree of civilian and military in Feaver's framework.



Source: Feaver 1995: 411

With that, Feaver presents the expected outcomes (see table 2.1).

Table 2.1

Agency Model Outcomes and Their Associated Equilibrium Conditions		
Monitoring and Working Outcome	Strategy Pairs that would Produce this Outcome	Equilibrium Conditions Associated with that Strategy Pair
Monitoring/Working	Civilians monitor and the military works if monitored, but shirks if not monitored	$C1 < W - S2 - ag$ (S1-S2) and $w2 > s2 - bgp$ and $w1 < s1 - agp$
Monitoring/shirking	Civilians monitor and the military always shirks	$C1 < (bg - ag)$ (S1-S2) and $w1 > s1 - agp$ and $w2 < s2 - bgp$
No monitoring/working	Civilians do not monitor and military always works	$C1 > 0$ and $w1 > s1 - agp$ and $w2 > s2 - bgp$
No monitoring/shirking	(1) Civilians do not monitor and the military always shirks (2) Civilians do not monitor and the military works if monitored but shirks if not monitored	(1) $C1 > (bg - ag)$ (S1-S2) and $w1 < s1 - agp$ and $w2 < s2 - bgp$ (2) $C1 > W - S2 - ag$ (S1-S2) and $w2 > s2 - bgp$ and $w1 < s1 - agp$

Source: Feaver, 1995, 413

The model, although elegant like many game theoretical models, lacks the instruments to assess the cost or benefits. Besides, it assumes that the main problem is compliance rather than coups, discussion about roles or any other issues of CMR. But it shows that the military's as well as politicians' behavior relies on a complex structure of cost-benefits.

According to Suzanne Nielsen (2005, 68-69), there are five dependent variables in the CMR: coups, military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance and effectiveness. Coups refer to the use, threat or attempt to take over power by armed forces. Influence is the impact of military culture and thought in society. Friction encompasses the disagreements between civil and military authorities. Compliance appeals to the degree of accomplishment of the goals imposed by the civilian leadership. Effectiveness refers to the degree of efficiency achieving the goals imposed. This

classification came from a survey made by Finner (1999) about issues in CMR. Further works of Nielsen (2009) adopted a narrower scope focused on the American case. Although this literature departs from our interest, the American and European focus accounts for an important share in the literature.

One of the works of Trinkunas (2005) goes beyond the conventional western CMR. He attempts to explain the Venezuelan case contrasting it with Argentina, Chile and Spain. To that purpose he looks for key areas where military may or may not have decisional power: External Defense, Internal Security, Public Policy and (political) Leadership Selection (Trinkunas, 2005, 7). Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers & Wolf (2011, 139-140) extended the work of Trinkunas into a five-dimension framework to assess CMR including: a. Leadership selection (or Elite Recruitment); b. Public Policy; c. Internal Security; d. External Defense; and e. Military Organization. Leadership selection refers to the selection of political leaders, and how the military in some case has certain powers to restrict such process (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers & Wolf, 2011, p. 139). Public Policy, "*comprises the rules and procedures of the processes of policy-making (...) and policy-implementation regarding all national policies except the narrowly understood aspects of security and defense policy*" (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers & Wolf, 2011, p. 140). Internal Security refers to the activities of border control, internal intelligence, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and law and public order. External defense involves the defense policy, especially doctrine forces abroad and operations conduction (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers & Wolf, 2011, p. 140).

Other authors like Schiff (1995) also address the CMR in developing countries. Her theory asserts that the concordance of three players (military, political elite and citizenry) on four aspects determines the nature of good or bad relations: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the method of recruiting military personnel and the style of the military. With that she is able to explain certain behaviors in the military that seems to be at odds with a democracy.

That literature; however, doesn't allow for extrapolating a case where civilian control doesn't seem to be the only dimension into account. Koonings & Kruijt (2002, 1) try to go a little beyond that with their concept of "political armies", which is the fact that professional armies devoted only to external defense seem to be the exception rather than the norm. They recognize three generations of authors dealing with CMR. The first (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002, 16-17) sees the politicization of armed forces as an anomaly or dysfunction, to be corrected in the future. The second generation sees the intervention of

armed forces as an interest of the higher or middle classes. The third (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002, 18-19) develops an intra organizational analysis to explain the interventions as a result of inner actors from the armed forces, allied with specific sectors from society. Similarly, Desch (1998) attempts to solve the contradiction between Laswell (1941) and Andreski (1980): while the first assumed that lower threat meant easier control of the military, the second sustained that lower threats spurred the military into other areas, specially politics. According to Desch, the solution to the conundrum is dimensional: while external threats ease the control, internal threats hamper it. To sum up, CMR literature only addresses a military buildup as an autocratic response to a political involution away from democracy. Military buildups and democratic control are seen as two extremes on a single axis.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature could be considered a subtype of CMR literature in some ways. Security Sector Reform as the name conveys, puts an emphasis on the reform of the security forces as a whole: that involves not only the military, but also the police and the intelligence apparatus: "*Security in this context means the protection of citizens and the state from threats that endanger normal life, public safety, and survival*" (McFate, 2010, 217). SSR literature has two distinctive features: it is highly focused on a very specific scope of application (here the term "Reform"); and concentrates on the idea that democratic control cannot be exerted fully without the oversight of the whole security apparatus. Beyond that, "*It is a relatively ambiguous concept, which refers to a plethora of issues and activities related to the reform of the elements of the public sector charged with the provision of external and internal security*" (Hänggi, 2004, 3); Furthermore "*Although SSR is still an evolving and, therefore, contested concept and lessons learned from practical experiences are still rather scarce, it increasingly shapes international programmes for development assistance, security cooperation and democracy promotion.*" (Hänggi, 2004, 3). The features of SSR have become especially relevant with the focus of British policy toward the commonwealth where security commitments sometimes require constabulary forces, and United Nations, where reconstruction processes during or after peacekeeping operations usually involve rethinking the entire security apparatus. In spite of the lack of precision and an emphasis in practical knowledge at the expense of theoretical development, SSR contributed to the discussion through the incorporation of new players (see table 2.2): Although in the specific context of this project it does not add much. This, since security is seen at best as a condition to be reached through efficient provision, and where security sectors play a role comparable to a "*precondition of*

sustainable economic development” (Hänggi, 2004, 11), and at worst: *“Poorly managed and governed security apparatus; excessive military spending; security apparatus”* (Hänggi, 2005, 30). It is not until recently that this literature recognized *“Law-enforcement related tasks”* (Schnabel & Krupanski, 2012, 19) inductively and only in the European context. However there is at least a recognition of its connection with development: *“The subsequent adoption of ‘security sector reform’ by leading actors in international development, including the World Bank, the OECD, UNDP, or even the European Union reflects an emerging consensus within the international development community regarding the so-called security-development nexus.”* (Lambert, 2011, 164).

Table 2.2. Definitions of the ‘Security Sector’

Perspectives	Definition A	Definition B	Definition C	Definition D	Focus
Narrow	Security forces	Groups with a mandate to wield instruments of violence	Core security Players	Organisations authorised to use force	State centric
	Civilian management and oversight bodies	Institutions with a role in managing and monitoring	Security management and oversight bodies	Civil management and oversight bodies	
Broader		Judiciary, penal system, human rights ombudsmen	Justice and law enforcement institutions	Justice and law enforcement institutions	
			Non-statutory security forces	Non-statutory security forces	Human centric
				Non-statutory civil society groups	

Source: Hänggi, 2004, 6

2.2. International Security.

A second body of literature concerning the phenomenon of defense reforms is International Security especially that referred to neighboring relations, rivalry and arms races. This literature addresses only part of the puzzle and is related to many of the intervening causes. It provides one of the alternative explanations for a military reform: military reforms can be the product of a perceived threat from foreign countries or internal armed no-state actors. That can, for example, explain why there is big interregional difference in military expenditure, or percentage of population in armed forces. South

Korea for example keeps armed forces bigger in size than countries with equal or bigger size, GDP or population like Brazil.

The focus however is placed on the systematic causes of war and threats; therefore, armed forces are accounted as a variable dependant of international politics. Morgenthau (1948) presents armed forces only as one of 9 aspects of national power, and describes these only in function of quality, quantity and leadership. Aaron is another example of the realist arguments about military power as a necessity, although he never addresses directly what or how is achieved, only the why (Aaron, Raymon 1966). Carr (1939) also considered military force, but among a smaller list of only three items. Besides economic and military power, Carr specifically identifies the power over opinion instead of population, like Aaron and Morgenthau had done. In doing so, he recognizes the non passive nature of population. Therefore he anticipates that although population can be easily counted as a variable, the effect of any population depends not only on the sheer numbers, but also on factors harder to quantify like attitudes, identities and reactions. More recent authors like Waltz, also view armed forces and armament as interchangeable, and present only in the dichotomy peace/war: *"A state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace"* (Waltz, Kenneth, 2001, 160). And later he insists in the point: *"Positively, to necessitate the arming of peacefully inclined countries some countries must be ready and willing to use force to make their wills prevail. Negatively, there must be lacking the authority that can prevent the unilateral use of such force"* (Waltz, Kenneth, 2001, 187). In that sense the presence or absence of authority is treated as structure, while we see certain agency in creating authority.

For the literature coming from the Realist school, we can safely say that *"This type of ISS features the general dynamics of interaction amongst rival armed forces: arms racing, arms control, the impact of technological development and suchlike [...] In the UK literature this whole understanding and approach is often labeled Strategic Studies"* (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 16). The English School may be less conservative, but is certainly more subtle about it. Alas, it is less explicit about the role of military power, usually conceived to explain the anomaly of order defiance *"independence also has its price, in economic and military insecurity"* (Watson, 1992, 14); Rather than the regularity of order preservation: *"Order promotes peace and prosperity, which are great boons. But there is a price"* (Watson, 1992, 14). Another school close to that of Realism is Neoinstitutional Liberalism which goes in the same direction. The most prominent set of

ideas would be summarized in the "Soft Power" and "Hard Power" of Joseph Nye (2004). He establishes three forms of power with their respective policies: hard, using military power, coercive diplomacy and alliance policies; economic, employing bribes, aid and sanctions; and soft through public, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy (Nye, 2004, 31). Although he concedes that "The military can also play an important role in the creation of soft power" (Nye, 2004, 116) that recognition is aimed at the foreign impact of armed forces in the role of Defense International Cooperation.

But even beyond those schools the focus is rather stressed in armed forces as security or in security beyond armed force. Critical Constructivism, for instance "*Looks to other collectivities that the state, yet mostly concerned with military security*" (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 36). Even not-yet defined forms of thought moved along those lines in terms of approaches: "[...] *some anticipating later Critical and Constructivist approaches, questioned whether the Cold War conflict was real, or just a construction set up for the convenience of the ruling elites in the two superpowers (Kaldor, 1990). Dissidence was also possible on military grounds, as to whether raising the dangers of nuclear war was an appropriate response to ideological and superpower bipolarity*" (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 1006-107). Some constructivists however do recognize some security dimensions other than external threat: "*What is strikingly absent from the post-Cold War security debate is any recognition of domestic threats to security that are not simply off-shoots of external ones*" (Lebow, 2003, 317) he even mentions how other authors worked about it: "*Only the Kantian explanation stresses the internal causes of peace: common practices that construct common discourse and identities which have subtle but powerful influences on expectations and behavior*" (Lebow, 2003, 348). Here Lebow aptly diagnoses an omission in the literature, but makes no insight regarding it. "*The bottom line of my story – and of my book, my story taught me – is that compartmentalization is blinding and dangerous*" (Lebow, 2003, 348).

Emphasis on certain aspects is given by various schools of thought: Richard Little points out the military emphasis of Marxist authors like Anderson (Little, 1994), but in that search Marxian scholars rarely go beyond the military as an extension of the dominant class. Ken Both stresses the focus of Realists on strategy and national strategy, and therefore the majority of IR scholars dedicated to International Security (Both, 1994). Mitchell projects the interest of conflict resolution, placing the military as part of a problem, rather than the solution: the emphasis of this focus is more on what military shouldn't be, rather than what they should be or how (Mitchell 1994).

On another vein, Holsti (1996, 150-182) attempts to answer to the low number in armed conflicts in Latin America based on realist/geostrategic (162), cognitive (164), domestic (167), sociocultural (169) and liberal/institutional (171) models, summarizing along the way most of that part of the literature in International Security from International Relations. Other authors like Buzan & Wæver aim to present the security scenarios not as an outcome from global security, but essentially as a product regional security. South America in their framework represents a very stable security complex.

But international security in general would not address the specific subtleties of military forces. In terms of hierarchy, it rarely moves below the political and strategic level. Authors explore below those levels (Luttwakk for instance) don't descend in the military operations ladder, trough operational, tactical and even technological level (see table 2.3). But this emphasis is always in the context of conventional warfare, as all the literature that recognizes such levels. In some cases literature transcended conventional warfare into nuclear warfare, to the point that *"in 1983, Buzan (1983: 3) could point out that security was an 'underdeveloped concept' and 'seldom addressed in terms other than the policy interests of particular actors or groups' "* (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 2). It is still a difficult question *"whether to see security as inextricably tied to dynamics of threats, dangers and urgency"* (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, 12). Although the question of whether security is exclusively a matter of military affairs exists, whether the military is exclusively a matter of security does not seem to be considered relevant by the literature.

Table 2.3 Levels of military actions and decision according to different authors

Tuner (2003, 15)	Barno (2006, 17)	Luttwakk (2001, 89-91)
	Political	Grand Strategy
Strategic	Strategic	Strategy
Operational	Operational	Operational
Tactical	Tactical	Tactical
		Technical

In sum, we must consider that this literature does not descend below the political and strategic levels: therefore much of the operational, tactical and technological level goes beyond the scope of these insights. According to the most comprehensive explanation of success in conventional warfare: *"Both realists and liberals view capability as a product of material wherewithal (...) IR theory treats capability as a simple, unitary entity (...) The whole notion of a simple unitary "capability" fundamentally misrepresents*

military potential, which is inherently multidimensional" (Biddle 2004: 192). In sum the particular configuration of a reform goes unaccounted for in International Security literature in particular and in IR in general since military power is mainly used a single variable related to international politics as cause or consequence of it. And the relation with the territory is read in the same vein: "*in general, the territory of the state still protects its citizens from most conflicts with other states*" (Kinsella; Russett & Starr, 2010,60).

The only exceptions in this literature that resembles our framework are some very recent works. Sechser & Saunders (2010) focus on mechanization of armies: how the number of military heavy equipment is dependent on the presence of internal guerrillas and terrain, among other variables. The work of McBride; Milante & Skaperdas (2011) "*reconciles theoretical models of conflict—which have suggested that when income is high, there should be more conflict as there is more to fight over—with the empirical literature in which conflicts are observed with greater frequency in low-income countries*" (McBride; Milante & Skaperdas, 2011, 463), this through the fact that while income creates more incentive for conflict, it also allows to invest in state capacity which can offset and surpass the direct conflict generation effect on income. Gartzke reaches a similar conclusion about how the change in the relation between capital and labor in armed forces depends on how "*wealth does influence states' decisions in constructing military forces*" (Gertze, Erik, 2001, 481). This goes against the contention that "*strong (democratic) power would pursue a conventional, capital-intensive military strategy against an unconventional opponent.*" (Caverley, 2008, 52) which is possibly true only for the particular cases where every enemy is external, and every democracy is a strong state. Finally Battaglini (2013) creates a nuanced model to explain arms imports in South America. He describes the imports of weaponry (without the distinction we aim for this study) as the product of three variables: an expansive strategic assessment, the availability of budget and a political focus on defense issues (Battaglini, 2013, 74). Again, like Sechser & Saunders the outcome is exclusively military hardware, not defense reform as a whole.

2.3. Civil and Ethnic wars.

A third body of literature related to the phenomenon is the one that addresses internal, civil and ethnic wars. Although some consider this a branch of International Security, the marked emphasis in internal rather than external conflict and the condition of the State a variable rather than a constant or an assumption sets this corpus apart. John

Mueller (1989) argues (in the line with the “end of history” concept) that wars are obsolete and increasingly turning unthinkable, in a world where ideas would be predominant.

But Kaldor (1999) claimed that globalization had brought “new wars”, contrasting them with the “old wars” among established powers. That spurred a debate, since authors like Levi & Thompson (2011) sustain that the works of Mueller (1989) and Kalyvas (2005, 91-92) evidence that internal conflict had been a traditional kind of conflict, that simply predated the creation of the modern nation-state, a notion that Berdal had already argued based on early modern Europe (Berdal, 2003, 493). Similarly, Newman argues that *“it is not the case that there is a linear increase in civil war in parallel to a decline in interstate war for any sustained period, including after the Cold War”* (Newman, 2004, 180); that *“new wars thesis argues that patterns of victimization and human impact are peculiar to the late 20th century and are worsening. However, there is little evidence to substantiate such a claim”* (Newman, 2004, 181); and that the criminal, ethnic or other motivations of “new wars” have been prevailing through history. Henderson and Singer, based on systematic (data base) evidence claim that *“we suspect that the “new wars” are readily conceptualized using extant war”* (Henderson & Singer, 2002, 186). Others reached the similar rebuff based on evidence: *“contrary to the ‘new wars’ thesis, battle severity and civilians killed in civil conflicts have significantly decreased since the end of the Cold War”* (Melander; Öberg & Hall, 2009, 329).

Kaldor (2013, 2-16) retorted that actors, goals, methods and forms of finance still justify the separation between “old wars” and “new wars”: the emergence of varying combinations of networks of state and non-state actors; the fight in the name of identity; the pursuit of control over population rather than territory; and the new forms of predatory private finance justify her separation between concepts. Without trying to solve the debate, we find the connection between pre-modern state wars and contemporary conflict valid: there is an underlying logic in armed forces different from international rivalry.

The last, together with the outcome of different process of state formation, points to the fact that Third World security problems are different from those in developed countries: *“The argument is made, therefore, that security means something very different in the Third World as compared to its meaning for other states”* (Peoples & Vaughan, 2015, 65), and more specifically: *“Third World states historically have not experienced the same challenging external threat environment (although they have often faced significant internal threats), and their state structure have turned out to be quite different”* (Desch, 1996, 244). That last point is a central antecedent to the hypothesis of this project. In that

sense part of this literature adds, to the external role of the armed forces, a role in fighting internal enemies of the state “*This may reflect a belief that capital-intensive armies are inherently superior from a military standpoint to labour-intensive ones, and that it is therefore natural for Third World states to develop the former rather than latter*” (Wend & Barnett, 1993, 322). This idea contributes partially with our main hypothesis: extensive power projection can be verified by a combination of high manpower. However two aspects make our claim different. First the relation with physical capital is more complex: while we expect no increase in military equipment with lethal capability, we expect an increase in the equipment with no-lethal capabilities. Second, we see a role for armed forces not only *against* organized enemies (politically or economically motivated) but also in the face of no direct challenge or threat.

Staniland (2012) presents an innovative insight into civil conflicts. He rejects the idea of a zero-sum relation between the State and insurgents, and instead present the relations mediated by two dimension: the degree of cooperation among the contending forces (active, passive or non-existent) on the one, and the distribution of control of territory (segmented or fragmented) on the other hand. This dimension was taken from a previous work of Kalyvas (2006, 88-89): “*Sovereignty is segmented when two political actors (or more) exercise full sovereignty over distinct parts of the territory of the state. It is fragmented when two political actors (or more) exercise limited sovereignty over the same part of the territory of the state*”. That allows Staniland to present an image of the civil wars and conflicts with more variation (see table 2.4)

Table 2.4 A typology of wartime political orders

	State-Insurgent Cooperation		
	Active	Passive	Nonexistent
Distribution of control			
Segmented	Shared sovereignty	Spheres of influence	Clashing monopolies
Fragmented	Collusion	Tacit coexistence	Guerrilla disorder

Source: Staniland, 2012, 248.

However, the focus is still put on armed conflict rather than armed forces, the phenomenon to explain starts and ends with violence.

2.4. Stateness

A fourth kind of literature relevant to us is that of stateness, specifically where it concerns the creation of infrastructural power. The work of Mann (1984, 1997 and 2008) has acquired great relevance to explain political phenomena, beyond the presence or lack of democracy. Mann establishes a difference between two dimensions of power: “despotic” and “infrastructural”. The first is the *“the range of actions that the state elite is empowered to make without consultation with civil society groups”* (Mann, 2008, 355). According to Mann this is the form of power that has received the attention of social sciences in the last decades. The second instead is *“the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and implement its actions across its territories”* (Mann, 2008, 355).

From those forms of power Mann fixed each level in high and low, so that combining them he gets four kinds of regime. If the despotic power is low and the infrastructural power low, there is a “Feudal” regime. When despotic power is high and infrastructural power low, there is an “Imperial” regime. If despotic power is low and infrastructural high, there is a “Democratic” regime. Finally if both kinds of power are high we are in presence of a “Single Party” regime. See table 2.5.

Table 2.5. Two dimensions of state power, revised.

Despotic power	infrastructural Power	
	Low	High
Low	Feudal	Democratic
High	Imperial	Single Party

Source: Mann 2008:357

The notion of infrastructural power has acquired in the last years a remarkable relevance. The article of Mann 2008 itself opens a special edition of *Studies in Comparative International Development* devoted to that concept. Soifer (2008) for example sustains that there are three approaches to infrastructural power. The first is one that emphasizes the capabilities of the state, that is, the relation between the central state and society (Soifer, 2008, 236-238). The second looks at the weight of the state, that is, the institutions that radiate power and the society (Soifer, 2008, 239-242). And the third is the subnational variation, attending to the central state and the institutions that project power through the territory (Soifer 2008, 242-244).

The idea is similar to Stephen Krasner's questioning of sovereignty as a unified concept. Krasner recognizes four types of sovereignty: Domestic, related to the internal affairs; Interdependent, associated to the flows of people, goods, information o others in and out of the country; International Legal, which is the formal recognition by other states; and finally Westphalian, that is, the autonomy to elect the national leaders without external interference (Krasner, 1999, 9-25). The point he argues is that beyond the pretension of equality of among states, they have varying degrees of each strand of sovereignty.

Other works in stateness and state typology are close to our framework, but still don't encompass the attempt to project infrastructural power. Danreuther establishes types of state depending on their strength, state-society synergy, predominance of internal versus external threats, and degree of benefit it obtains from global economy (Danreuther, 2007, 324). That produces four types of state: *developed*, with "*strong national states, a powerful synergy between state and society, and the capacity to benefit substantially from integration into the global economy*" (Danreuther, 2007, 324) and perceive threats almost exclusively from external sources and include what is termed as the First World. *Globalizing* states have varying degrees of benefit from global economy, and are moving toward externalization of security threats, the "*ability to generate the state-society synergy necessary for broad developmental growth*" (Danreuther, 2007, 324), and the author considers them a transitional phase and includes Southeast Asia, China, India and some Latin American countries. *Praetorian* states are a broad category with all varieties of authoritarian regimes, essentially rentier and/or repressive countries. The key security features are focused on internal threats to the regimes, with a connection with global economy mainly through the export of few types of natural resources regimes as diverse as North Korea, Cuba or Saddam Hussein's Iraq are included here (Danreuther, 2007, 325). Finally, *failed states* have very weak, with low link with civil society, and few or no benefits from global economy and usually fall into the "new wars" type of conflicts (Danreuther, 2007, 325). In terms of Danreuther, instead of putting our focus on failed or praetorian states like much of the literature about stateness in International Relations, it is put on developing states.

Giraudy 2012 resembles some aspects of our framework in more detail: she collects three dimension of state strength from the literature: "*state territorial reach, state autonomy from non-state actors, and bureaucratized/professionalized state institutions*" (Giraudy, 2012, 601). Her works allow us to look beyond the weak/strong dichotomy, and observe the diminished subtypes that inhabit between the poles. The concepts of

“Weberianless-Nonreaching State” and “Nonreaching State” (Giraudy, 2012, 601) are especially useful to us. The first lacks both bureaucracy and territorial reach, while the second has only the last attribute missing. In our model, many countries which are Nonreaching states or Weberianless-Nonreaching State (but with a military apparatus) are attempting to turn into strong states, through extension of their power into far or unpopulated areas. As we stated before, they are not countries too weak as to be focused on their survival or too strong to not need power projection.

The work of Luna and Giraudy (2014) is an analysis anchored on two variables that follows the same vein. They try to provide a classification of State according to territorial reach, in respect to two variables: the “(1) *state officials’ incentives and access to resources to penetrate throughout the territory*” (Luna & Giraudy, 2014, 6) and the “(2) *the incentives and resources of territorial challengers to control parts of the territory*” (Luna & Giraudy, 2014, 6). With both variables settled at low or high level they create a fourfold typology of State’s Territorial Reach: I. Homogenous, with high penetration by the state and low by challengers; II Contested, with high penetration by State and Challengers; III Restricted, with low penetration by the state and high by challengers; and IV Un-projected, with low penetration by the State and the challengers (Luna & Giraudy, 2014, 6). Their framework is coherent with our idea that state could attempt to project power even in the absence of an organized challenger. While civil wars literature would be central on Contested and Restricted states, we are focused on how state increases projection through armed forces.

In terms of power projection Mann established other two dimensions relevant to our analysis. The first one distinguishes between *extensive* and *intensive* power. *Extensive power* is the “*ability to organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories in order to engage in minimally stable cooperation*” (Mann, 1986, 7). *Intensive power* is instead “*the ability to organize tightly and command a high level of mobilization or commitment from participants, weather the area and numbers covered are great or small*” (Mann 1986, 7). In the second dimension he establishes two additional types of power: Authoritative and diffused: “*Authoritative power is actually willed by groups and institutions. It comprises definite commands and conscious obedience*” (Mann 1986, 8); “*Diffused power, however spreads in a more spontaneous, unconscious, decentered was throughout a population, resulting in similar social practices that embody power relations, but are not explicitly commanded*” (Mann, 1986, 8). From those categories he creates four forms of organizational reach. (See Table 2.6.).

Table 2.6. Forms of organizational reach

	Authoritative	Diffused
Intensive	Army command structure	A general strike
Extensive	Militaristic empire	Market exchange

Fuente: Mann 1986:9.

2.5. Framework for analysis.

Our main Hypothesis assumes that State can turn Authoritative Intensive forms of power into other forms of power: for example, the presence of the armed forces can be turn into Militaristic Empire; and eventually in diffused forms of power that ultimately won't require a military structure (*"states are the core residue left after imperial expansion has ended"* Centeno & Enriquez, 2010, 346). In that sense armed forces do not fulfill a role defeating challengers of the state, they also project infrastructural power. This idea has been tested for actual internal organized threats: *"states facing a greater risk of insurgency due to their high proportion of rough terrain tend to maintain lower mechanization rates, possibly in anticipation of this domestic threat"* (Sechser & Saunders, 2010, 506), but not for the absence of an organized enemy. In that sense, the model we are proposing is closer to the idea of state making and state protection than of war making of Tilly (1985, 181).

In this sense the relation that Pion Berlin found (1992, 85), in terms of Mann's work, would be an increase in the infrastructural power by the State, allowing the military to exercise the despotic power previously out of their reach (Bureaucratic Authoritarianism); also, more specifically, enabling the armed forces to extract extensive power from their intensive power. The advantage of this literature is that it could reveal certain changes in developing countries that do not conform to the CMR literature.

Now, there is recognition of certain relations among some of these bodies of literature. Job (1992, 20) for instance had already turned to the work of Mann to re-conceptualize security for the Third World, as well as the approaches of Tilly to explain the use of violence for the construction of European states (Job, 1992, 25).

But this work aims to look at the specific reforms of countries in an intermediate state of development, looking deeper into the agency intended by politics. In sum we can

say we are adding a third dimension to the armed forces reform: one that has to do with building state capacity.

Figure 2.1 Three dimensions of military reform.




Table 2.7 Changes in variable according to type of military reform.

		External factor triggering dimension inside the reform		
		Low infrastructural power	Threat	Low defense accountability
Military personnel		Increases	Varies	Decreases
Deployment of forces	Core insecure areas	No	Yes	No
	Peripheral Insecure areas	Yes	Yes	No
	Areas with a vacuum of power	Yes	No	No
	Secure areas	No	No	Yes
Increase in Military equipment	Lethal	No	Yes	No
	Non-lethal	Yes	Yes	No

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